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EDITOR’S PREFACE
We are pleased to announce the inaugural issue of Journal of Retracing Africa 
(JORA). For centuries, Africa’s socioeconomic and political development has been 
dictated by a dynamic and complex coalescence of external and domestic forces. 
Narratives on Africa abound. Many, unfortunately, hold myths, misconceptions, 
and misrepresentations of issues and events surrounding the continent. The 
launching of JORA is an att empt to off er a thoughtful and balanced reconstruction 
of African societies, histories, and cultures. By providing a platform for scholars to 
provide their unique perspectives on all aspects of the African experience, JORA 
makes a valuable contribution towards producing an account about Africa that is 
more accurate, comprehensive, and reliable. 
In this issue, Victor Olumide Ekanade examines the problems and challenges 
of Africa’s economic development in a globalizing world. Probing the infl uence 
of external fi nancial institutions on Africa’s economic policies and focusing on 
Nigeria’s consequential economic experiments since the 1980s, he shows how 
“Nigeria’s uncritical embrace of Western-styled neoliberal economic policy largely 
undermined the country’s quest for a sustainable economic development.”1 As 
the author shows in the article, the implementation of a neoliberal agenda has 
“encouraged capital fl ight, authoritarianism, corruption, [and] the mushrooming 
of the informal sector.” To address these problems, the author insists that the 
federal government “must practice home-grown development policies that fulfi l 
the developmental aspirations of the masses.”2
Any discussion of the various victims of the Nigeria-Biafra War, 1967-1970, 
is incomplete without analyzing the experiences of minorities within Biafra: Efi k, 
Ijaw, Ogoja, and Ibibio. During the war, as Arua Oko Omaka reminds us, these 
ethnic groups faced “layers of loyalty and disloyalty both to the federal authority 
and the Biafran government” which caused them to experience “a high degree of 
persecution, molestation, injustice, [and] psychological torture.”3 Through careful 
analysis of oral and writt en evidence on the war, the author shows how the need 
to establish control over “the oil-rich region” not only made the confl ict to assume 
an international dimension, but also exposed minorities “to more dangers and 
destruction.” He argues that identifying these ethnic groups “as victims would 
place them in their rightful position in the nation’s history.”4  
1 Victor Olumide Ekanade, “The Dynamics of Forced Neoliberalism in Nigeria Since the 
1980s,”Journal of Retracing Africa 1, Issue 1 (2014): 1. 
2  Ibid., 27. 
3  Arua Oko Omaka, “The Forgott en Victims: Ethnic Minorities in the Nigeria-Biafra War, 
1967-1970,” Journal of Retracing Africa 1, Issue 1 (2014): 1.
4  Ibid., 45.
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The two articles off ered in this issue, coupled with nine book reviews, will 
undoubtedly engage our thinking about how global forces have intermingled 
with domestic elements to shape the political and economic landscape in Africa 
in the colonial and postcolonial era. You are encouraged to submit your best 
research papers to JORA. JORA is a no-fee, peer-reviewed, open access journal, 
and authors will enjoy wide readership from publishing in the journal. Open to 
diff erent but rigorous research methodologies—and insisting on manuscripts 
that make original and compelling contribution to knowledge—JORA welcomes 
submissions focusing on African studies since the precolonial period. 
This publication was made possible because of the dedication of JORA’s 
managing editor, copy-editor, book review editors, members of the editorial 
board, the editorial assistant, authors, external reviewers, BePress, Eastern 
Kentucky University Libraries, Offi  ce of the Dean, University Programs, and the 
African & African-American Studies program at Eastern Kentucky University. We 
thank you. We will continue to count on you in what promises to be many more 
successful years of JORA.
Ogechi E. Anyanwu
Editor-in-Chief.
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The Dynamics of Forced Neoliberalism in 
Nigeria Since the 1980s
Victor Olumide Ekanade 
Redeemer’s University, Nigeria
Abstract: Over the last 30 years, the logic of market liberalization has 
increasingly permeated the social and economic facets of political and 
economic discourse to such an extent that the core values about the 
responsibilities and obligations of nation-states to their citizens have 
been strained. The welfarist ethos featuring in the public fi nance of some 
European and North American countries for much of the twentieth 
century included values such as equity and access, which manifested 
in the subsidization and aff ordability of social amenities. The welfarist 
concept, premised on the experience of western European economies, 
was based on the logic that if a large proportion of the population could 
not aff ord clean water, health care, or education for their children, 
long-term corporate interests of the society would be undermined. 
State-subsidized provision of these essentials was thus fully embraced 
because of the understanding of the short and long-term public interest 
involved. However, by the 1980s, changes in international markets 
fostered a precipitous decline in African economies. Many governments 
thus jett isoned its state-centered economic strategy since it could no 
longer fund public expenditure on sustainable basis. Nowhere was the 
shift in economic policy more pronounced as in Nigeria. The drastic 
decline in national revenue due to a dip in international price of oil 
led to Nigeria’s balance of payment defi cit making the introduction of 
forced neoliberal economic policy inevitable. Analyzing the dynamics 
of policy formulation and implementation since the 1980s, this article 
argues that Nigeria’s uncritical embrace of Western-styled neoliberal 
economic policy largely undermined the country’s quest for a 
sustainable economic development.  
Keywords: Nigeria; Neoliberalism; Social Welfare; Democracy; Poverty; 
Military Regimes; Economic Reforms; Privatization; Corruption.
Introduction
Nigeria’s experience with neoliberal economic policy presents a classic example 
of a state which progressively shifted from a relative welfare state to ad-hoc 
welfarist state and full blown free market economy. The implementation of 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in the country between 1986 and early 
1990s, in addition to neoliberal policies under civil regimes from 1999 until the 
present, have had colossal implications for Nigeria’s national development. In 
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this neoliberal context, democracy was re-established to satisfy market demands 
without adequate regard to social needs. Neoliberal reforms were not concerned 
with social issues but with market effi  ciency, which worked against the basic 
tenets of human rights and constitutional safeguards for Nigerian citizens. Forced 
neoliberalism is state policy foisted on the people in a democracy without their 
due consent. This practice is typical of politics in post-colonial Africa. 
Neoliberal economic policies and profound internal socio-political 
convulsions are challenging African states, including Nigeria. Even though they 
are acknowledged as independent states within the global community, African 
countries have not adequately established themselves as nations with national 
identities. They also have not conquered the challenges of good governance and 
gained their economic autonomy. The post-Westphalian states of Europe treat 
African states as dependent associates, providing them with fi nancial aid through 
international agencies such as the Brett on Woods institutions.1 Nigeria for instance 
is a subordinate unit responsive to the policies of international organizations, and 
subject to the imposition of their programs such as the World Bank’s SAPs based 
on neoliberal principles.2 The SAP instituted in Nigeria in 1986 under General 
Ibrahim Babangida proved dreadful in terms of implementation and outcomes as 
it led to a drop in the standard of living of the majority of Nigerians as subsidies 
on essential commodities and services were removed, provoking a series of 
devastating riots.  Furthermore, the outcomes of neoliberal policies established 
with the return of democratic regime of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, between 1999 
and 2007, were also disappointing. As a democratic regime, it was expected that 
the Obasanjo government would create conditions aimed at reducing poverty 
and inequality. Rather the established democracy abided with market standards 
without due consideration for the needs of the citizenry. This article examines 
the contradiction of the institutionalization of democracy in Nigeria as a moral 
value while at the same time negating the social rights of its citizens. It argues 
that the growth of electoral democracy occurred at the same time of heightened 
social problems in the country, and shows how neoliberalism since 1999 worsened 
the plight of a large segment of the Nigerian population, deepening poverty, 
inequality, unemployment, and social exclusion.
1  George Clement Bond, “Globalization, Neoliberalism, Historical Conditionalities,” The 
Journal of African American History 88, no. 4 (Autumn, 2003): 330. Peter Lewis, “From 
Prebendalsim to Predation: The Political Economy of Decline in Nigeria,” The Journal of 
Modern African Studies 34 no.1 (Mar, 1996), 81.
2  Babawale Tunde and Onuoha Browne, “The State Corruption and the Challenges of Good 
Governance,” in Rich but Poor, Corruption and Good governance in Nigeria, ed. Lai Olurode 
and Remi Anifowoshe (Lagos: University of Lagos, 2005), 64.
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Conceptual Framework
The received wisdom in literature on neoliberalism in Africa and Latin America as 
posited by Graham Harrison, George Clement Bond, Margaret Hanson and James 
Hentz , Adebayo Olukoshi, Chibuzo Nwoke, and Pablo Gonzalez Casanova is that 
the failure of leadership in these continents and the need to revamp their distressed 
economies necessitated the introduction of neoliberal policies in the polities.3 
This amounts to a misreading of these societies, especially African states where 
neoliberalism is fundamentally in disharmony with African communal ways of 
life but fi nds relevance in the socialist mode of production. Another consensus in 
literature is that structural adjustment and neoliberal policies imposed on Africa 
and Latin America all carry a specifi c political and economic principle that is 
decisively anti-people- anti working class but pro-private capital. One of the many 
tragedies of neoliberalism is that in its bid to promote the forces of the market and 
long term interests of the private capitalist class, systematic assaults have been 
launched on the African and Latin American states’ welfare, social, and public 
expenditure programs, which have in turn resulted in backlash. Thus it cannot 
be assumed that developmental needs of the state and citizenry will be served by 
simply turning to the market. The body of literature mentioned above does not 
however explain how neoliberalism interacted with the democratization process, 
corruption, and constitutional provisions in these states. This is a gap this article 
will att empt to fi ll in, using the context of the Nigerian state. 
According to Adejumobi Said, historically the provision of social welfare 
services has been a state responsibility in both developed and developing 
countries. However the introduction of privatization, which was meant to help 
curtail government expenditure, creates new social problems or exacerbates 
existing ones which would require supplementary public spending in order 
to contain them.4 For Jarret Alfred5 and Claude Ake,6 colonialism left behind a 
legacy of a social welfare system irrelevant to the social needs of the masses in 
Nigeria, as it was structured for profi t maximization and essentially designed to 
3  Graham Harrison, “Economic Faith, Social Project and a Misreading of African Society; 
the Travails of Neoliberalism in Africa,” Third World Quarterly 26, no, 8 (2005): 1303-1320; 
Bond; Margaret Hanson and James Hentz , “Neocolonialism and Neoliberalism in South 
Africa and Zambia,” Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 3 (1999): 479-502; Olukoshi Adebayo 
and Chibuzo. N. Nwoke, “The Theoretical and Conceptual Underpinnings of Structural 
Adjustment Programmes” in Structural Adjustment in West Africa, eds. Olukoshi Adebayo, 
Omotayo Olaniyan and Femi Aribisala (Lagos: NIIA, 1994), 11-27.
4  Adejumobi Said, “Privatisation Policy and the Delivery of Social Welfare Services in 
Africa: A Nigerian Example,” Journal of Social Development in Africa 14, no. 2 (1999): 87-108.
5  Alfred A. Jarrett , “Problems and Prospects of the Social Welfare Systems of Sierra Leone 
and Nigeria,” International Social Work 34, no. 2 (April, 1991): 143-157. 
6  Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (New York: Longman, 1981).
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meet not the needs of the colony but those of the colonial masters. Thus it did not 
encourage investment in social welfare schemes for the African population. After 
independence, Nigeria inherited the outdated social welfare system left behind 
by the colonial order. This had serious implications for structural adaptation, cost 
effi  ciency, and eff ectiveness of these public corporations in terms of delivery of 
welfare services since most of the public corporations were centrally controlled. 
For Arowosegbe Jeremiah, the inherent character of the “imported state,” oriented 
exclusively towards maintenance of law and order, explains the overdeveloped 
status of the state’s apparatuses of violence, which was a tool for maximizing 
colonial exploitation, relative to its educational, health, and other welfare systems. 
Local elites under successive regimes in Nigeria have not innovatively engaged 
with reinventing the state but have continued along the same trajectory. 7  
Historical Background of Neo-liberalism
Neoliberalism is rooted in the classical liberal ideas of Adam Smith and David 
Ricardo. Both viewed the market as a self-regulating mechanism tending towards 
equilibrium of supply and demand, thus securing the most effi  cient allocation 
of resources. These British economists and philosophers considered that any 
constraint on free competition would interfere with the natural effi  ciency of market 
mechanisms, inevitably leading to social stagnation, political corruption, and the 
creation of unresponsive state bureaucracies.8 In modern times, neoliberalism 
emerged as a synonym for the mainly externally directed att empt to remove the 
state from the economy. The World Bank’s Berg Report claimed that many of 
Africa’s economic problems emanated from excessive ineffi  cient state intervention 
in the economy.9 
Neoliberalism is steeped in a system of economic, social, and political 
ideals that are rightwing versions of the modern post-enlightenment themes of 
rationality, democracy, and individual freedom. Neoclassical economics rethought 
these eighteenth and nineteenth century principles of economic modernism and 
for a while reluctantly abandoned pure market determination for limited state 
regulation during the Keynesian interlude of post-war period. During the 1970’s 
when widespread problems of stagfl ation were deemed beyond the reach of 
Keynesian fi scal policy, nineteenth century liberalism was revived as a rightwing 
7  Jeremiah Arowosegbe, “Claude Ake: Political Integration and the Challenges of 
Nationhood in Africa,” Development and Change 42, no. 1 (January, 2011): 349-365. 
8  Steger Manfred, Globalization: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003). 
9  Harrison, “Economic Faith, Social Project,” 1303-1304.
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version of neoliberalism.10 
Neoliberalism now emerged as monetarism in the 1970s, a refl ection of the 
triumph in the west of the monetarist shade of neo-classical economics, which 
was against Keynesianism and all it stood for. Monetarism is essentially about 
ascendency of the market and “peripheralization” of the state, which in the 
monetarists’ view had become too large, unfi t and ineffi  cient, and excessively 
interventionist. As part of the eff ort to reduce the size and role of the state, they 
called for the withdrawal of a host of subsidies that were introduced at the height 
of the Keynesian revolution, the elimination of subventions to public enterprises 
and privatization of those enterprises.11 
The globalization of the monetarist agenda was skillfully assisted with the 
coming to power in the early 1980s of conservative governments dedicated to the 
cause of monetarism in the leading western countries that dominate the world 
capitalist economy. The most prominent of these governments were those of 
Margaret Thatcher in Britain, Ronald Reagan in the United States, Helmut Kohl in 
West Germany, and later Brian Mulroney in Canada.12 They all dismantled their 
welfare states in response to the global economic crisis of the 1970’s, the rising costs 
of labor in Europe and USA, and the rapid development of capitalism in newly 
industrialized countries (NICs) of Asia that led to increased competition, reduced 
profi t rate, and the crises of overproduction. The resultant eff ect of the emergence 
of these rightwing governments, unrepentant in the pursuit of monetarism, was 
the reorientation of the dominant outlook within the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank. These two key institutions shed their Keynesian toga and 
embraced monetarist principles.13 
The outcome of this reorientation in the IMF and World Bank had fundamental 
and colossal consequences for developing countries. By 1983/1984, the African 
debt crisis was serious as debt servicing alone consumed about a third of all their 
foreign receipts and moved them into severe depression.14 Thus, the World Bank 
and IMF were able to use the debt crisis in Africa to gain substantial leverage over 
10  Elaine Hartwick and Richard Peet, “Rethinking Sustainable Development: Neoliberalism 
and Nature: The case of the WTO,” Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science 
590 (November, 2003): 188-211.
11  Adebayo and Chibuzo,  “The Theoretical and Conceptual Underpinnings of Structural 
Adjustment Programmes,” 14.
12  Rick Rowden, “An Overview of the Increased Coordination of the International Monetary 
Fund, World Bank and World Trade, Trade Liberalization Policies,” 2nd draft working paper, 
Washington DC, October, 2009.
13  Adebayo and Nwoke, “The Theoretical and Conceptual Underpinnings of Structural 
Adjustment programme,”14-15.
14  Richard Sandbrook, The Politics of Africa’s Economic Stagnation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 24.
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economic policies in Africa which hitherto was limited. In their att empt to come 
to terms with the crisis of their local economies, developing countries approached 
the World Bank and IMF for fi nancial aid, giving the United States the chance to 
sell them the Brady Plan.15 Western countries that dominate these fi nancial bodies 
such as the United States not only ensured that the two institutions fell in line with 
their new economic thinking but also encouraged them to make the acceptance 
and implementation of market reforms  a pre-condition for fi nancial assistance 
to debtor nations.16 Given the comatose state of most post-colonial third world 
economies, they embraced the new policies and conditions. The 1980s was the era 
of monetarists’ domination of economic policies in the third world. The IMF and 
the World Bank eff ectively imposed their policies of SAP as a panacea of economic 
transformation throughout developing countries, including Nigeria. 
Nigeria’s Experience with Structural Adjustment 
As a major oil-producing nation, Nigeria enjoyed almost a decade of unprecedented 
revenue boom arising from the petroleum price increases of the 1970’s. One 
remarkable characteristic of Nigeria’s expenditure during this period was its 
“welfarist” orientation with government domestic investments and concentrated 
provision of a massive transport system, road networks, public buildings, and 
health infrastructure. Employment rates soared, coupled with increases in 
subsidies on food, transport, health, fuel, and education.17 The Shehu Shagari 
regime (1979-1983) systematized the subsidized sale and distribution of specifi c 
commodities known as essential commodities to Nigerians. These included 
rice, milk, beef, sugar, among other items. These products were imported by the 
Nigerian government through the Nigerian National Supply Company and sold 
to Nigerians at rates below prevailing market prices. These subsidies remained 
all through the Shagari era but terminated with the introduction of SAPs in 
1986, which led to the removal of subsidies, reduction of public expenditures, 
15 John T. Rourke, International Politics on World Stage (New York: Mc Graw Hill, 2000), 
467- 468. The Brady Plan emphasized that bank creditors should grant debt relief to debtor 
states in exchange for greater assurance of collectability in the form of principal and 
interest collateral. Also, debt relief for debtor states needed to be linked to some assurance 
of economic reform and the resulting debt should be highly tradeable to allow creditors 
to diversify risk more widely throughout the fi nancial and investment community. 
See EMTA, “The Brady Plan,” accessed April 22, 2013, htt p://www.emta.org/template.
aspx?id=35&terms=brady+plan.
16  David .K. Leonard and Scott  Strauss, Africa’s Stalled Development: International Causes 
and Cures (London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2003), 25-26. See also Elmar Alvater, 
“Postneoliberalism or Postcapitalism? The Failure of Neoliberalism in the Financial Market 
Crisis,” Development Dialogue Uppsala no. 51 (January, 2009): 73-88. 
17  Thandika Mkandawire, “Fiscal Structure, State Contraction and Political Responses from 
Africa,” in Between Liberalisation and Oppression: The Politics of  Structural Adjustment in Africa, 
eds. Mkandiawire Thandika and Olukoshi Adebayo (Dakar: Codesria, 1995), 37. 
Ekanade  | 7
Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 1, Issue 1, Spring 2014
htt p://encompass.eku.edu/jora/
privatization, and devaluation of domestic currency.18
Part of the reason for the introduction of SAPs was the economic decline that 
started in the early 1980s.  The international source of the crisis was the dramatic 
fl agging of the oil markets in the fi rst half of the 1980s, which made the country’s 
fi nancial position deteriorate. Export revenues plunged by 53 percent between 
1980 and 1982, from US$27.1 billion to US$12.7 billion.19 At the same time, the 
value of internal public debt increased by 72 percent from US$8.5 billion in 1979 
to $26.9 billion in 1983 while external debt was estimated at $14.13 billion during 
this period.20 As commitments accumulated, short-term borrowing increased, and 
interest rates escalated. On the domestic scene, the downturn was accentuated by 
the monocultural nature of the economy, the character of the politicians during the 
return of the civilian governments in the early 1908s, who were fl ippant with federal 
funds, and the endemic corruption of the same class and gross mismanagement of 
the national treasury. The crisis raised questions of sustainability of state subsidy 
as social services suff ered due to underfunding. The industrial sector shut down 50 
percent of its fi rms and thousands of its workers were laid off .21 These multifaceted 
crises provided the immediate domestic context for the adoption by the Nigerian 
state of an orthodox program of structural adjustment sponsored by the Brett on 
Woods institutions.22
The fi rst serious att empt to examine the role of the state in the Nigerian 
economy came in 1981 when the Shehu Shagari regime appointed a presidential 
commission of inquiry to examine the parastatals. The commission’s report 
recommended an increased role for the private sector in administering the partially 
government-owned organizations.  This recommendation was to cut government 
expenditure at the expense of the masses. In the context of the debt problems, the 
Shagari administration in April 1982 introduced the Economic Stabilization Act to 
control imports, introduce more discipline into the monetary system, and narrow 
the gap between public expenditure and income through cuts in government 
18  Ikubolajeh, Logan and Kidane Mengisteab, “Introduction,” in Beyond Economic 
Liberalization in Africa: Structural Adjustments and Alternatives, eds. Kidane Mengisteab and 
Ikubolajeh Logan (London: Zed, 1995), 3.
19   Lewis Peter, “The Dysfunctional State of Nigeria,” in Short of the Goal: U.S. Policy and Poorly 
Performing States, eds. Nancy Birdsall, Milan Vaishnav, and Robert L. Ayres (Washington 
D.C: Center for Global Development 2006), 83-116.
20  James Guseh and  Emmanuel Oritsejafor, “Government Size, Political Freedom and 
Economic Growth in Nigeria, 1960-2000,” Journal of Third World Studies  xxiv, no 1 ( 2007): 
142.
21  Olukoshi Adebayo, “The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria,” in Between 
Liberalisation and Oppression: The Politics of  Structural Adjustment in Africa, eds. P. Thandika 
Mkandiawire and Adebayo Olukoshi (Dakar: Codesria, 1995), 163-164.
22  Adebayo Olukoshi, “From Crisis to Adjustment in Nigeria,” in The Politics of Structural 
Adjustment in Nigeria (London: James Currey and Heinemann, 1993), 1.
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expenditure.23  The stabilization program failed because the regime was reluctant 
to remove subsidies and commercialize public enterprises. Many stalwarts of the 
ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN) owed their enormous wealth to their direct 
control over the parastatals, marketing of rice, fertilizer, and petroleum products.24 
Consequently, the Shagari government approached the IMF for an extended fund 
facility of between N1.9 and N2.4 billion. The IMF insisted on certain conditions 
including privatization, a curb on government spending, trade liberalization, 
and introduction of sales tax. 25 No concrete agreement was reached with the IMF 
before the government was overthrown on December 31, 1983. 26 
The successive regime of Muhammadu Buhari agreed with the IMF on 
the need for fundamental reforms in the Nigerian economy but was unwilling 
to accept part of the IMF’s recommendations such as currency devaluation, 
privatization, liberalization of trade, and withdrawal of the petroleum subsidy. 
It nevertheless embraced the policy of commercialization but insisted on state 
regulations. This resulted in a stalemate and the outcome was the tightening of 
the boycott  of Nigeria by western banks and export credit guarantee agencies. The 
leading fi nancial institutions insisted that the government had to obtain a clean 
bill of health from the IMF before the country’s debt, put at about $20 billion in 
1984, could be rescheduled and fresh capital injections authorized.27 The second 
approach adopted by Buhari’s government, in its bid to mitigate the eff ects of 
the disparate pressing demands by the IMF and Nigerians on the economy, was 
the introduction of the policy of counter trade, a modern day variant of trade by 
barter, with Brazil and some West European states. The scale of the counter trade 
deals was however too small and costly relative to the magnitude of the country’s 
economic problems28 Thus, the regime introduced a comprehensive package of 
austerity measures as part of its own stabilization eff orts with severe restriction 
23  Adebayo Olukoshi, “The Management of Nigeria’s External Debt: Issues and 
Problems” in Nigerian External Debt Crisis: Its Management, ed. Adebayo Olukoshi (Lagos: 
Malthouse,1990), 31.
24  Ibid.  See also Adebayo Olukoshi and Tajudeen Abdulraheem, “Nigeria, Crisis 
Management under the Buhari Administration,” Review of African Political Economy no. 34 
(1985):  95-96.
25  Robert. H. Bates, John H. Coates and Jeff rey G. Williamson, “Lost Decades; Lessons from 
Post-Independence Latin America for Today’s Africa,” NBER Working Paper 12610, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusett s (2006), 20.
26  Yahaya Sheu, “State Versus Market: The Privatization Program of the Nigerian State,” 
in The Politics of Structural Adjustment, ed. Adebayo Olukoshi (London: James Currey and 
Heinemann, 1993), 17-18.
27  Adebayo Olukoshi, “The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria,” 170-171. See also 
Yahaya Sheu, “State Versus Market: The Privatization Programme of the Nigerian State,” in 
The Politics of Structural Adjustment, 17-19.
28  Olukoshi, “The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria,” 170-171.
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on imports. This made it diffi  cult for local industries to procure essential imported 
raw materials forcing many of them to close shop. Subsequently, many workers 
were laid off , and the government itself retrenched many employees to increase its 
“cost eff ectiveness.” All of these actions were accompanied by high infl ation. The 
price of basic food items rose, and life became increasingly diffi  cult for the masses 
and even the affl  uent.29 
Adequate health care is critical for the worker to maintain his productivity 
while education is important in order to improve the quality of that productivity. 
Cost recovery measures introduced in health and education sectors by the Buhari 
regime had a reverberating impact on the citizenry. The Nigerian constitution 
stipulates that federal, state, and local governments should fund, in a coordinated 
manner, a three-tier system of health care. However, total health expenditure 
in real terms declined sharply from a total of N825.5 million in 1980 to N128.3 
million in 1984 representing a fall of about eighty-fi ve percent.  The negative 
impact of this manifested in the increase of the under fi ve-year-old mortality 
rate which moved from 181.1 per 1,000 live births in 1980 to 192.4 per 1,000 live 
births in 1985.30 The illness rate in rural areas also approached 100 per thousand, 
particularly among children and the aged people in the 1983-1984 period.  The 
education sector also worsened and with it came employees’ inability to benefi t 
from educational policy31. The total number of secondary schools in the country 
fell from 38,211 in 1984 to 35,281 in 1985. In addition, the government imposed 
heavy levies, indiscriminately on parents of school children. At the tertiary level, 
the government withdrew the feeding program of students, thus increasing the 
cost for students and their parents32 Buhari’s legitimacy was soon dissipated by 
his authoritarian nature and he was deposed by General Ibrahim Babangida in 
29  Peter Lewis, “From Prebendalism to Predation: The Political Economy of Decline in 
Nigeria,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 34, no. 1 (Mar, 1996): 79-103. See also Adebayo 
Olukoshi, “The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria,” 157-185.  Between 1979 and 
1989 the price of garri increased by 700 percent, rice by 1,700 percent, beans by 1,350 percent 
yams 3,000 percent, frozen fi sh 900 percent, beer 350 percent milk 1,500 percent, bread 2,000 
percent, and palm oil 300 percent.  See The Financial Post, Lagos, October 1- 4, 1989, 9.
30  L.A Amaghionyeodiwe, “Fiscal Federalism, Health Care Spending and National 
Development: The Nigerian Experience,” in Fiscal Federalism and Nigeria’s Economic 
Development, ed., Ben 
Aigbokhan (Ibadan: Nigerian Economic Society, 1999), 394. See also Nigeria Demographic 
and Health Survey, 1990.
31  Ibeanu Okechukwu, “The Deteriorating Condition of The Nigerian Peasantry,” in Dead-
End to Nigerian Development: An Investigation on the Social, Economic and Political Crisis in 
Nigeria, ed. Okwudiba Nnoli  (Dakar: Codesria, 1993), 142.
32  Okwudiba Nnoli, “The Deteriorating Condition of the Nigerian Working Class,” in Dead-
End to Nigerian Development: An Investigation on the Social, Economic and Political Crisis in 
Nigeria, 169. 
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August, 1985.
In 1985, Nigeria was still reeling under a heavy debt burden with declining 
oil revenues, and Babangida opened a national debate on whether Nigeria should 
take the IMF loan or not and the role the government should play in managing the 
economic crisis. The premeditated decision of the regime prevailed as Babangida, 
despite the people’s protests, adopted a supposedly homegrown adjustment 
program akin to the IMF prescriptions. It was obvious that the debate was a 
smokescreen because Babangida had earlier appointed Chief Olu Falae, a pro-IMF 
personality as the nation’s fi nance minister and Babangida himself had insisted on 
the necessity to adjust the naira to its ‘realistic’ value.33 This was the SAP, which 
Babangida claimed would halt economic stagnation and revitalize growth. The SAP 
was a package of neoliberal economic reforms, primarily aimed at strengthening 
market forces and retrenching the state. This had dire consequences for the Nigerian 
political economy and its peoples, state, agriculture, and industry.34 For instance, 
the public sector carried out its program of retrenchment through sackings and 
various other means. One of these was to disband existing public enterprises such 
as the Nigerian National Supply Company and the various commodity boards. 
Another was to merge enterprises. Reorganization in corporations such as Nigeria 
Railway Corporation, Nigeria Airways, and Nigeria Airport Authorities led to the 
retrenchment of 8,000, 2,500, and 2,000 workers respectively in 1988. In same year, 
1988, 32,000 workers in the textile industry were retrenched as spasmodic and 
eventual permanent closure of industries ensued.35
Faced with ever declining standards of living and without resources that 
formerly co-opted oppositions and nurtured clients, the state under General 
Babangida increasingly relied on coercion to implement structural adjustment 
plans.36 General Babangida sought to assuage popular opposition to adjustment 
through selective provisioning of certain welfare facilities through institutions such 
as Directorate for food, roads, and rural infrastructure (DFRRI) to provide special 
assistance to rural areas, networks of Peopleand Community Banks to extend 
credit to small scale and local borrowers. The Bett er Life Programme sponsored 
by the First Lady was also intended to promote the production of craft works 
33  Olukoshi Adebayo and Tajudeen Abdulraheem, “Nigeria, Crisis Management under the 
Buhari Administration,” Review of African Political Economy 12, no. 34 (1985): 101.
34  Att ahiru Jega, “The State and Identity Transformation under Structural Adjustment 
in Nigeria,” in Identity Transformation and Identity Politics under Structural Adjustment in 
Nigeria. ed. Att ahiru Jega, (Uppsala: Nordiska African Institute and Centre for Research 
and Documentation,  2003), 31-33. 
35  Okwudiba Nnoli, “The Deteriorating Condition of the Nigerian Working Class,” 162.
36  M. Paul Lubeck, “The Crisis of African Development: Confl icting Interpretations and 
Resolutions,” Annual Review of Sociology, 18 (1992): 519-540.
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among the poor, especially women. These initiatives were mostly underfunded, 
ephemeral, or suff used with corruption, and their impact on popular welfare was 
questionable.37
Education was consistently underfunded at less than 6 percent of total 
expenditure of the sector during this regime. In previous years though, especially 
between 1978 and 1982 the federal government spent more than 6 percent of total 
expenditure on the educational sector. However, in 1992, the federal government 
spent less than 1 percent of its total expenditure on the sector.38 This had severe 
repercussions for infrastructure, teaching, and research activities, and on the 
quality of students produced. It aff ected the morale of teachers who were owed 
arrears of salaries for several months and who had to abandon their duties out 
of necessity to seek other means of sustenance.39 Healthcare equally suff ered due 
to the withdrawal of subsidy from that sector under Babangida. Infant mortality 
increased from 87.2 per 1,000 live births in 1985 to 191 per 100 live births in 1993 
as access to safe water also diminished from 45 per 1,000 in 1985 to 40 per 1,000 in 
1993 when he stepped aside. By 1991, debt servicing ate up 47 percent of the overall 
federal budget and remained so in 1992 and 1993. By 1993, the defi cit Babangida 
accumulated was put at N90-N100 billion. The annual budget for that year was 
N120 billion. One is left to wonder how a country that was adjusting could aff ord to 
amass huge defi cit year after year, especially after 1989.40 Thus, the SAP rather than 
helping to revamp the economy simply fed into the existing dynamic of decline, 
thereby becoming an integral factor in the continuation of Nigeria’s economic 
crisis. Cumulatively, the SAP produced considerable hardship, poverty, and 
discontentment across the Nigerian society. The middle class was overwhelmed 
by declining purchasing power and unemployment. Coping mechanisms for some 
workers included running their private cars as taxis to augment income after the 
day’s work, while low income urban dwellers were driven to subsistence levels 
and school children had to hawk wares to supplement family incomes.41
The SAP was eventually discontinued in 1994 under the General Sani 
Abacha regime as part of his legitimization schemes. It was replaced with a policy 
37  Lewis, “From Prebendalism to Predation,” 88.
38  Dipo Busari and Olaniyan Olanrewaju, “Decentralisation and Education in Nigeria: 
Issues and Options, in Fiscal Federalism and Nigeria’s Economic Development, ed. Aigbokhan 
Ben (Ibadan: Nigerian Economic Society, 1999), 516.
39  Cyril Daddieh, “Education Adjustment Under Severe Recessionary Pressures: The Case of 
Ghana,” in Beyond Economic Liberalisation in Africa: Structural Adjustment and the Alternatives, 
ed. Kidane Mengisteab and Ikubolajeh Logan (London: Zed Books, 1995), 42. 
40  Adedayo Oluyemi-Kusa, “The Structural Adjustment Program of the Nigerian State”, in, 
Structural Adjustment in West Africa, ed. Olukoshi Adebayo, Omotayo Olaniyan and Femi 
Aribisala (Lagos: Pumark Publishers, NIIA, 1994), 91.
41  Lewis, “From Prebendalism to Predation,” 98.
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of guided deregulation meant to enhance economic development by appropriate 
discretionary interventions from the government.42 According to Kunle Amuwo, 
the Abacha regime actually favored a statist economic policy, but certainly not a 
nationalist agenda. Amuwo noted further that “this way Abacha set the tone and 
tenor to pocket the economy and privatize state fi nances.”43 
Abacha, Neoliberalism, and the Nigerian Textile Industry
The application of neoliberal policies in the Nigerian textile sector can be used to 
dramatize the government’s wholesale mortgage of indigenous industrial fortunes 
and their potential benefi ts. General Sani Abacha compounded the economic 
misfortunes of the Nigerian manufacturing sector by extending the frontiers of 
the neoliberal agenda to the textile sector with his decision to take Nigeria into 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1994 without providing safeguards.44 
The WTO agreement opened Nigerian markets to all kinds of imported goods 
and turned Nigeria into a dumping ground for frivolous imports. The agreement 
was endorsed for political reasons – personally for Abacha to garner support and 
sympathy from the international community, which had turned Nigeria into a 
pariah state and perhaps to provide patronage for his cronies. No sooner had 
Nigeria signed the WTO pact than Nigerian industries, including 135% textile 
fi rms began crumbling like a pack of cards.45  The negative eff ect of unbridled 
importation subsequently led to a drastic decline in the contribution of the 
manufacturing sector to Nigeria’s GDP.46 Cheap Chinese-made textiles against 
which Nigerian fi rms could not favorably compete fl ooded Nigerian markets. Not 
even the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) passed in the twilight 
days of Clinton’s administration in the United States could reassure them.47  This 
unbridled importation of textiles impoverished cott on farmers and brought untold 
hardships on textile industry workers who were subsequently laid off  because 
locally produced textiles could not favorably compete with Chinese textiles which 
were cheap.
No nation has developed without a textile industry. The textile industry 
was one that set Britain on a path of sustainable economic growth in the mid 
42  Ifamose Folasade, “The Fourth Republic Economic Reforms in Nigeria and the Millennium 
Development Goal One: A perspective,” African Studies Review 9 (June 2010): 410.
43  Kunle Amuwo, “Transition as democratic regression,” in Nigeria during the Abacha Years: 
1993 – 1998: The Domestic and International Politics of Democratization. eds. Kunle Amuwo, 
Daniel Bach and Yann Lebeau (Ibadan: IFRA, 2001), 5.
44  The Guardian (Lagos), October 28, 2007, 37.
45  The Guardian (Lagos), September 4, 2005, 16-17.
46  The Punch Editorial (Lagos), August 2, 2006, 16.
47  The Guardian (Lagos), September 4, 2005, 16.
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nineteenth century. The textile industry uses relatively simple technology and it 
is an industry well suited for Nigeria with its huge population and rich cott on 
growing culture. Nigerian-made textiles had popularity in the export market and 
gained prominence in places as distant as Dakar.  In the mid-1980s, the industry 
had about 350,000 people in over 200 mills. As of 2010, however, the Nigerian 
textile industries had less than 2,000 persons in their employ.48 Nigeria’s public 
enterprises were a serious drain on the national budget in the immediate post-
SAP years.49 Abacha did not change their fortunes in any positive way. According 
to Kunle Amuwo, “a predatory regime like Abacha’s was characterized by a 
distinctive patt ern of economic management, including arbitrary change, defi cit 
fi nancing, and capital fl ight. More importantly in the realm of social choice, the 
“rationality” of the market was vitiated by the “logic” of rent seeking.50 
The Abacha regime also made att empts to implement welfare policies and 
programs to mitigate the adverse impact of its economic policy. A key model here 
was the Petroleum Trust fund meant to rehabilitate public roads, fund education, 
and provide critical infrastructure in the health sector.  Its implementation was 
skewed as it mediated well in the Northern part of Nigeria with marginal presence 
in the Southern part.  In all, it merely served to help perpetuate and legitimize 
Abacha’s regime in Nigeria, who died in offi  ce in 1998. 
In General Abdulsalami Abubakar’s att empt to administer the privatization 
program, he affi  rmed in his independence speech of October 1, 1998 that “the 
public sector investments in the provision of services, utilities and goods have 
yielded litt le dividends.”51 He subsequently set up the Bureau of Public enterprises 
(BPE) to oversee the supervision of  the sale of these public enterprises. The exercise 
did not gain popular support because of the command nature of the military and 
the incoming civilian administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo literally 
scrapped the Abubakar privatization program.
The Neoliberal Agenda of the Obasanjo Years
By 1999, the annual Gross Domestic product (GDP) in Nigeria averaged 2.25 
percent while population growth averaged 2.8 percent. This mismatch was a 
guarantee of mass poverty as the index was put at 67 percent, meaning no less 
than eighty million Nigerians were absolutely poor. The cumulative eff ects of 
years of mis-governance had translated to economic stagnation, marked by a 
low GDP, galloping infl ation, high unemployment, falling per capita income, 
48 The Punch Editorial , (Lagos), November 22, 2010, 14.
49  Gary Moser, Scot Rogers and Reinold Ventil, “Nigeria’s experience with SAP,” Occasional 
Paper 148 (Washington. D.C. : IMF publication, March 1997), 43.
 Kunle Amuwo, “Transition as Democratic Regression”, in Nigeria during the Abacha Years, 5.
51  The News Magazine (Lagos), March 29, 1999, 16-17.
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an energy crisis, and  declining industrial capacity. Thus, in 1999, Obasanjo 
inherited not only a fragile state and economy, but also a political economy driven 
cyclically by trade shocks brought about by its dependence on oil. The regime 
also inherited a collapsed industrial support infrastructure.52 The dysfunctional 
state of federal utilities, which had been organizationally crippled by corruption, 
ineffi  ciency, and indebtedness, with many of them not having audited accounts 
for many years, eventually informed Olusegun Obasanjo’s adoption of neoliberal 
principles.  Obasanjo invited the IMF and the World Bank to help provide second 
level quality checks for his macroeconomic policies. Specifi cally, he invited the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector arm of the Brett on 
Woods institutions to advise the nation on privatization.53  According to the Bureau 
for Public Enterprises (BPE), the IFC served as the sole adviser of the Federal 
Government with respect to the eff ective implementation of its privatization 
program from its inception in 1999.54  However the IFC pulled out of Nigeria in 
early 2001. It cited the auction of Nigeria’s international air traffi  c rights by the 
Nigerian government as one of the main reasons for its withdrawal.55 Based on 
these challenges, Obasanjo justifi ed his privatization program as an exercise that 
would reposition the government to concentrate resources on its core functions 
and responsibilities while enforcing rules and policies so that markets can work 
effi  ciently. The objective was to make the government leaner and more effi  cient, 
reduce waste and corruption, free up resources tied down by public enterprises, 
and improve service delivery to the people. It was hoped that privatization would 
introduce new capital, technical, and managerial effi  ciency in the privatized 
enterprises, thereby reviving them, creating new jobs, and adding value to the 
economy. A fundamental plank for implementation of the neoliberal ideology is 
the Public-Private Partnership, an alternative source of infrastructure fi nancing, 
which is rooted in a complex but contractual relationship between government 
and private sector organizations. Here, the private sector makes available the 
social welfare services, and the government simply regulates such services and 
provides an enabling environment. Just as Hanson and Hentz  linked the adoption 
52  The Nation Newspaper (Lagos), May 29, 2001, 36.
53  The Guardian Newspaper (Lagos) April 6, 2002.
54  Samuel Aluko, “Federal Reform Agenda and the Nigerian Economy, 1999-2007: A Critical 
Assessment,”2008, accessed January 23, 2013,  
htt p://www.nigerianmuse.com/opessays/?u=Sam_Aluko_Federal_Government_Reform_
Agenda_and_the_Nigerian_Economy_1999_2007_A_Critical_Assessment.htm.
55  In excerpts of a lett er to Obasanjo, IFC vice president Peter Woicke said that “the 
opportunity for a successful near-term privatisation of Nigeria Airways has been diminished 
by the auctioning act,” accessed April 15, 2013, htt p://www.ipsnews.net/2001/05/fi nance-
nigeria-international-fi nance-corporation-pulls-out-of-privatisation-venture/.
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of neoliberal policies in South Africa and Zambia to domestic dynamics within 
those jurisdictions, Nigeria’s adoption of neoliberal principles followed the same 
logic because the policy obtained domestic support from the emerging middle and 
elite class, as they possessed the fi nance capital to buy into the privatized fi rms, 
with litt le or no support from the masses who saw it as further impoverishment.
The template for the framework of the economic reform agenda of President 
Obasanjo was largely infl uenced by the IMF and World Bank (WB).56 Their core 
prescriptions for Nigeria were: (a) Unbundling and privatization of the state 
electricity company; (b) Legislation and technical assistance to promote domestic 
gas sector reforms; (c) Liberalization of the down stream petroleum sector; (d) 
Funding to address key infrastructure constraints; and (e) Legislations for bill 
on fi scal responsibility, procurement and the extractive industries transparency 
initiative. To drive this reform agenda, technocrats from these international 
fi nancial institutions who had neoliberal inclinations were brought on board 
of President Obasanjo’s economic team. They included Ngozi Okonjo Iweala, 
Oby Ezekwesili, and Soludo Charles who later became Governor of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria. Their policy agenda was encapsulated in National Economic 
Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS). The IMF and World Bank were 
heavily involved in funding the reform agenda. Since 2001, the World Bank has 
given approximately $300 million in International Development Association (IDA) 
credits for reform and privatization of Nigeria’s energy sector. However, the key 
ingredients of the International Financial Institution’s policy advice meant to 
shape Nigeria’s economic policies have so far led to a dysfunctional electricity 
privatization process failing to eff ectively provide pro-poor energy and encouraged 
kleptocracy in the oil sector as they helped in perpetuating the conditions that 
enable companies operating in the Niger Delta to maintain a monopoly over the 
country’s natural resources.57
On privatization, Nigeria started a four-phased privatization program in 
July 1999. The fi rst phase involved the sale of the government’s shareholdings in a 
dozen of commercially viable enterprises, including banks, petroleum marketing, 
cement, and insurance companies. This was completed in December 2000. The 
second phase, which was to be completed in 2001, rather started late. One salutary 
impact of privatization was that all economic sectors and activities were exposed 
to competition and private initiative. Privatization has created a large pool of 
56  Obiora Chinedu Okafor, “The Precarious Place of Labour Rights and Movement in 
Nigeria’s Dual Economic and Political Transition, 1999-2005,” Journal of African Law 51, no. 
1 (April, 2007), 77.
57  Lucy Baker, “Facilitating Whose Power? The IFI Policy Infl uence in Nigeria’s Energy 
sector,” (2008), accessed January 22, 2013,  
htt p://www.brett onwoodsproject.org/update/60/bwupdt60_ai.pdf.
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new shareholders in Nigeria, bridging both income and geopolitical divides. It 
has changed the structure and depth of the Nigerian capital market and created 
awareness of the virtue of shared ownership as a form of savings. The program 
has relieved the federal government of the huge and growing burden of fi nancing 
debts and defi cits of public enterprises. It has in a way improved the allocative 
effi  ciency of the national economy and enhanced the volume of corporate taxes 
accruing in the national treasury.58  
The downside of the privatization played out with the dynamics of the 
privatization of Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL) a key item in the 
second phase.59 The Obasanjo regime in February 2001 successfully auctioned 
three Global Satellite Mobile (GSM) licenses and got expressions of interest from 
strategic investors in NITEL.  However ten years down the line, eff orts at selling 
NITEL had been bungled repeatedly as China Unicom, the preferred bidder, had 
not been able to raise suffi  cient funds to unbundle and revitalize it.60 NITEL was 
hastily sold to Transcorp which rationalized NITEL staff  by 70 percent, that is 
7,000 of the 10,000 staff  were retrenched because of the privatization exercise. Ex-
President Obasanjo handed Transcorp back to the late President Yar’adua on May 
27, 2007.61 The Obasanjo (1999-2007) regime virtually sealed the destruction of 
the land telephony system in order to privatize it. In other countries, particularly 
the industrialized ones, the land telephony is the main communication system 
with the mobile telephone system serving as a subsidiary and emergency outfi t to 
complement the land telephone system. 
The mobile telephone system has taken away much revenue from Nigerians 
and from the economy to their providers within and outside Nigeria. The fl ight 
of capital it has occasioned is excessive and most of the employment they created 
is in the informal sector. By 1999, the estimated share of the urban labor force in 
the informal sector in Lagos, Nigeria was 50 percent, Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, 31 
percent, Nairobi, Kenya 44 percent and Tunis, Tunisia 34 percent. Nigeria had the 
highest fi gure.62 Under Obasanjo, the informal sector thrived and witnessed real 
explosion in the mid-2000s as an enormous proportion of Nigeria’s population was 
58  Zayyad, H.R, “Privatization and Commercialization in Nigeria,” accessed January 
22, 2013, htt p://wiki.projectszoo.com/projectswiki/images/3/39/Privatisation_and_
commercialisation_in_Nigeria.pdf.  
59  OECD, African Economic Outlook: 2001-2002, African Development Bank, Development 
Centre for the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, France, 2002, 230.
60  Nigerian Tribune Editorial (Ibadan), February 24, 2010.
61  Akinpelu Olutayo and Ayokunle Omobowale, “Public Service Reforms and the Nigerian 
Telecommunications (NITEL) PLC,” Development and Society 40, no. 2 (December, 2011): 340.
62  Michael Todaro, “Urbanization, Unemployment and Migration in Africa; Theory and 
Policy” in Renewing Social and Economic Programs in Africa, ed Dharaim Ghai (London: 
Macmillan Press, 2003), 69.
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employed in this sector. This was parallel to the development of the crisis and the 
implementation of the SAP that led to massive layoff s. The share of people in the 
informal economy in Nigeria is one of the highest in Africa and represented nearly 
75 percent of non-oil GNP in 2003. This is a typical indicator of poverty63. The 
world development indicator also gives credence to this assertion as employment-
to-population ratio in Nigeria fell from 52 percent in 1991 to 51 percent in 2007, 
and the population below global poverty line remained at an all-time high of 86.4 
percent.64 
Nigeria entered the third phase of privatization in 2004 by privatizing 
nineteen enterprises. In 2005, it entered the fourth phase under Irene Chigbue, 
privatizing forty six enterprises and thirty eight others in 2006. In the fourth 
phase, major utilities such as the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) 
was unbundled into seventeen successor companies and established the National 
Electricity Regulation Commission (NERC), which set the framework and 
paved the way for the privatization of the electricity sector.65 Up to 2005, about 
N225 billion of taxpayers’ funds were pumped into the power sector to revive 
it alongside the unbundling program66.  The result however is that the reforms 
in the power sector have not translated into any meaningful changes. Power 
supplies remained epileptic as no conscious att empts were made to build new 
power generation and transmission plants. This development has had adverse 
eff ects on the manufacturing sector and small scale businesses where production 
cost is high thereby making fi nished goods uncompetitive with their imported 
counterparts. Another fall out of the spasmodic nature of the public power supply 
in Nigeria is the job loss in the manufacturing sector. This has been massive given 
the exorbitant production costs. In addition, considering the huge population 
trapped in the informal sector, a substantial number of these artisans depend on 
electricity to run their businesses. With frequent power outages, and the hike in 
power tariff s by President Goodluck Jonathan (from N8.00 to N40.00 per kilowatt )67 
the challenges of the masses is further compounded, and they are left jobless. A 
substantial number have resorted to criminal activities in the nation. This explains 
in part why arson, kidnapping, and other criminal activities and social vices are 
thriving in the Niger Delta region and other parts of the Nigerian state. 
It is also important to note that the Obasanjo regime’s inability to handle 
63  Danielle Obono, “Workers and Popular  Masses in Nigeria” (paper presented at the 
Conference of African alternatives: Initiative and Creativity Beyond Current Constraints, 
Leiden, Netherlands, July 11-14, 2007), 2.
64 World Bank, World Development Indicators  (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, April, 2009), 37
65  TELL Magazine (Lagos) May, 2007, 7
66  TELL Magazine (Lagos), June 26, 2006, 50.
67  Nigerian Tribune, (Ibadan), July 1, 2011, 1.
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problems in the power sector defeated its initiative of an export substitution policy 
in Nigeria.68 In fact, the import substitution industries (ISI) policy is the preferred 
model for development in advanced economies as it encourages local production 
instead of the importation of essential products. In terms of economic performance, 
the structural transformation of Nigeria has been slow in the area of privatization. 
Privatization itself has not worked well because of bad governance, corruption, 
non-tariff  barriers, and an inadequate regulatory framework.69 
 In his last days in offi  ce President Obasanjo, sold the Kaduna and Port 
Harcourt refi neries valued at $800 billion in May 2007 for a paltry $500 million 
to Blue Star Oil Service Limited, a consortium close to him.70 In addition, Eleme 
Petrochemicals Plant in Port Harcourt, the largest of its kind in Africa was sold for 
$225 million, an amount not even worth its spare parts. The unfortunate aspect 
is that the Nigerian government was supposed to maintain a minimum share of 
49 percent. However, Indorama, the buyer was given a 75 percent equity stake 
in Eleme. The same occurred with the sale of Egbin Power Station, (the largest 
generating station operated by Power Holding Corporation of Nigeria) which was 
also grossly underpriced and sold off  at a paltry N280 million or $2 million.71
Interestingly, the Nigerian Senate committ ee investigating the privatization 
of public enterprises since 1999 came up with appalling revelations about the 
Obasanjo regime. The committ ee discovered, through its public hearing that the 
regime sold the Aluminum Smelting Company of Nigeria built at the cost of $3.2 
billion to Russal, a Russian fi rm at the cost of $250 million. Only $130 million 
of the said $250 million has been paid, leaving a balance of $120 million, which 
was supposed to be used to dredge the Imo River as stated in the share purchase 
agreement. Six years after the sale, the dredging is yet to begin and the government 
has not been paid the balance of the money. In addition, no one has queried Russal 
for failing to fulfi ll its obligations. Even if the cost of building the smelter was 
infl ated through the procurement process, there is no justifi able reason why an 
asset worth $3.2 billion should be sold for $250 million.72
Delta Steel Company Limited presents another dimension of the fraud 
and irregularities involved in the sale of Nigeria’s public enterprises under the 
Obasanjo regime.  Global Steel Infrastructure Limited, a company that did not 
participate in the bidding process, except that it submitt ed an expression of 
68  TELL Magazine (Lagos), May 2007, 6.
69  Cyril Nweze, CBN Magazine (Lagos), November 2001, 47.
70  Baker, Facilitating whose Power?”
71  Ibid. 
72  Odey Adiza, “Privatization of Public Enterprises and Productivity: Nigeria’s Dilemma,” 
Journal of Emerging Trends in Economics and Management Sciences 2, no. 6 (2011): 493-494. 
Ekanade  | 19
Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 1, Issue 1, Spring 2014
htt p://encompass.eku.edu/jora/
interest, was declared the winner. BUA, which did the follow up with a technical 
bid, did not get the benefi t of the bid. The then Director General of the BPE, Julius 
Bala rationalized this untoward act with the assertion that “there is a diff erence 
between ‘the winner of a bid’ and ‘the preferred winner’ as there is the need for 
approval from council.”73 To compound matt ers, Delta Steel was valued by BPE at 
N225 billion but was sold for a paltry N 4.5 billion. These privatized enterprises 
have not added any meaningful value to the state and people of Nigeria. 
A total sum of N146.6 billion earned from the privatization process has been 
remitt ed to the coff ers of the Nigerian government since 1999. This is a paltry 
sum considering that investments by the government in these enterprises run 
into trillions of naira.  The assets of the privatized enterprises were deliberately 
undervalued, as rules and regulations governing the due process were subverted, 
and this has allowed corruption to fester. Those who withstand the worst of the 
government’s ineptitude now are the masses in the Nigerian state.74
Neoliberalism and Constitutionalism
The Nigerian state embraced planned and balanced economic development 
before 1985. Systematic development plans were made.  Planning of the Nigerian 
economy ceased when the Babangida regime introduced the IMF and World Bank 
imposed SAPs in 1986. However, poor economic planning has been more greatly 
accentuated since 1999, through the deregulation, privatization, and downsizing 
of the public service and general reform agenda of the Obasanjo regime, all 
encapsulated in his National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy 
(NEEDS).75 The economic philosophy of the government was hinged on the fact 
that the “market” has violated the Nigerian constitution, not only by abdicating 
the control of the major sectors of the Nigerian economy, but also by off ering 
Nigeria for sale to domestic and foreign private interests. By 2006, the government 
had divested from 116 enterprises.76 President Obasanjo’s government’s economic 
philosophy was premised on the mistaken assumption that, for the federal 
government to govern effi  ciently, it had to concentrate solely on governance. It 
neglected the fact that a government that cannot manage an industry successfully 
cannot govern effi  ciently.77 
Part of the fallout of the privatization program which has been unpopular 
with the Nigerian citizenry include the reversal of pension benefi ts of public 
73  Punch, (Lagos), August 17, 2011, 45
74  Ibid.
75   Folasade, “The Fourth Republic Economic Reforms in Nigeria,” 410.
76  The Nation (Lagos), May 29, 2009, 86. 
77  Aluko, “Federal Reform Agenda and the Nigerian Economy.” 
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servants under the Pension Reform Act of 2004 and the deduction from their 
monthly wages for pension. Equally appalling are the non-payment of pensions and 
gratuities, the non-creation of employment opportunities and the non-payment of 
unemployment benefi ts to those forced into unemployment. 78 These are violations 
of Article 16, section 2(d) of the Nigerian Constitution.79 The imposition of a 
contributory pension scheme on public servants in the name of pension reform is 
a violation of Article 173 of the Constitution, which seeks to protect the existing 
pension rights of public servants.80 In the words of Lai Olurode, when pension 
rights are not guaranteed, individuals exercise no scruples at engaging in corrupt 
behavior in order to make ends meet. Thus, the denial of pension rights has further 
deepened the challenge of endemic corruption prevalent in Nigeria 
The neoliberal agenda of the Obasanjo regime also went against the spirit 
and tenets of the Constitution on issues of educational objectives of the country. 
Article 18, section 3 of the 1999 Constitution provides that government shall 
strive to eradicate illiteracy and to this end, government shall, as and when 
practicable, provide, free compulsory and universal primary education, free 
secondary education, free university education and free adult literacy program.81 
However, the government worked at cross purposes by introducing public-private 
partnership (PPP) administration in unity schools (public schools). Fees were 
consequently introduced in primary and secondary schools and, very exorbitant 
fees in tertiary institutions alongside private universities. While the introduction 
of fees progressively were reduced, budgetary allocation for education fell from 
11.2 percent in 1999 to 1.8 percent in 2003, all against UNESCO’s recommendation 
of 26 percent for developing countries. Budgetary shortfalls undermined 
productivity of Nigerian intellectuals, starved knowledge institutions of vital 
resources for research, and adversely aff ected the quality of teaching and learning. 
Cumulatively, it has led to the peripheralization for the country’s intellectual 
community as an aspect of the general strategy of strengthening neocolonial 
imperialism in Nigeria. Furthermore, it has created a knowledge weak Nigerian 
state in a century that is knowledge driven. 82 Overall, the cumulative impact of all 
these actions and inactions of government are that education at all levels is now 
becoming increasingly less and less available to a decreasing percentage of the 
Nigerian population, further deepening the impoverishment of not just the people 
78   The Guardian (Lagos), November 14, 2006, 57.
79  Republic of Nigeria, The 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria (Lagos Printer, 
1999), 11.
80  Ibid., 69.
81  Ibid., 13.
82  Okpeh Okpeh, “Neoliberal Reforms, the Nigerian University System and the Challenges 
of the 21st century,” in Quill Pen, vol. 6 (Ibadan: Recard Publisher, 2007), 52-53.
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but also the nation as a whole. Thus, Nigeria stands the risk of being delinked from 
the gains and prospects of an increasingly globalized and competitive world.
Retrenchment in the Public Sector and Precarization of Labor
From the outset, a central thrust of neoliberal policies was wage and social 
austerity for workers to restore the profi tability of capitalist fi rms and the capacity 
of the state to assist in economic restructuring.83 In line with this thinking, since the 
inception of the Obasanjo regime in 1999, about 4.8 million Nigerians in the civil 
service, statutory corporations, state owned companies, in the banks, and insurance 
companies have been retrenched through the reform agenda of re-engineering the 
public sector of the economy and minimizing the economic role of government. 
It has continued to place emphasis on the private sector as the engine of growth 
of the Nigerian economy, whereas the private sector in Nigeria is very weak 
and depends on the public sector for its survival and continued growth. Given 
the warped reform policy, the downsizing of the public sector has consequently 
led to the downsizing of the private sector, because the economic managers in 
government do not appreciate that a decelerating public sector also leads to a 
decelerating private sector, and vice versa. All sensible reformers in history have 
increased rather than reduced employment quantum in very signifi cant manner. 
Neoliberalism, market fundamentalism, privatization, commercialization, and 
minimization of the role of the government in the economy do not collectively 
off er eff ective results for reducing poverty, because they do not suffi  ciently build 
or rebuild human capital. The type of privatization pursued by the successive 
Nigerian regimes has allowed cronyism, the plundering of national assets for the 
benefi t of the few in the elite class. 84 The policy model itself off ers very litt le and 
warrants litt le or no support as a suffi  cient economic policy directive for serious 
people-oriented policies. It does not address nor promote equitable income 
distribution, or a decent economic and social environment. The regime overlooked 
the political and social context of the malfunctioning public service. The reforms 
do not address substantive issues of equity and social justice in light of the 
distributive consequences of the restructuring. Consequently, the mere change of 
ownership from public to private has not guaranteed change in productivity and 
effi  ciency. This is besides the question of corruption and institutional crisis, which 
may equally bedevil a private company. In fact, several private fi rms have not 
performed much bett er than public companies in Nigeria 85
83  Gregory Albo, “The Crisis of Neoliberalism and the Impasse of the Union Movement,” 
Development Dialogue, 5 (January 2009):119-132.
84  Folasade, “The Fourth Republic Economic Reforms in Nigeria,” 411.
85  David Adeyemo, Adeleke Salami, Lanre Adeyemi, “An Appraisal of Economic Reforms in 
Nigeria,” Contemporary Management Research, 4, no. 2 (June 2008): 129.
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Most of the resources derived from privatizing public enterprises, for 
instance, has not been directed toward building human capital through education 
and training, to stimulate productivity in the economy. Retrenchment of workers 
with productive application of revenue further depressed the economy. In an ideal 
situation, new competent workers would be employed and that would stimulate 
the economy.  Downsizing of the public sector has negative multiplier eff ects. 
Retrenchment leads to reduced consumer demand, which reduces the propensity 
to produce, and in turn leads to a reduction in the rate of growth of the gross 
domestic product. It is a suicidal economic policy.
Nigeria’s adoption of the New Economic Partnership for Development 
(NEPAD), which is based on some classic pillars of neoliberal economic policies, 
helps to dramatize the negative impact of privatization, using the activities of 
South African fi rms in Nigeria as a case study. 86 NEPAD was adopted by African 
states in October 2001 with the objective of regenerating and integrating African 
economies.87 Under Obasanjo’s regime, then South African President Thabo Mbeki 
surreptitiously used NEPAD as a platform to open up Nigeria’s economy to South 
African investments and exports. The implications of this South African penetration 
have been inimical to the robust growth of the Nigerian economy. Joseph Stiglitz , 
a renowned economist and Nobel Prize winner, affi  rmed that neither theory nor 
economic evidence supports the claim that opening up your market can assure 
robust economic growth.88 A case in point is the Nigerian telecommunication sector 
where the South African fi rm, MTN is about the biggest player. MTN obtained its 
operating license in Nigeria in 2001 after paying over $285 million as license fee 
and another $1 billion to set up operations. In 2004 alone, MTN recorded an after 
tax profi t of over $2.4 billion in Nigeria.89 This amounts to over profi teering and 
massive exploitation of Nigerians who are the subscribers. 
A number of South African companies have also entered the fast food business 
in Nigeria, controlling almost 50 percent of the international fast food franchises 
in Nigeria. They are also making huge profi ts. In the media and entertainment 
industry in Nigeria, a South African company such as DSTV accounts for 80 
86  Aluko Olokun, The AU and NEPAD in Foreign Policy in Nigeria’s Democratic Transition 
(Abuja: Presidential Advisory Council on International Relations, 2005), 152-154.
87  Adeolu Durotoye, “The Politics of Globalisation” in Topics and Issues in International 
Relations, ed. Adegbulu Femi (Ogun: Babcock University Press, 2011), 131.
88  Joseph Stiglitz , Globalization and its Discontents. (New York: Norton, 2002), 21. See also 
Kurt Bayer, “Neoliberalism and Development Policy: Dogma or Progress,” Development 
Dialogue 51 (January 2009): 89-102.
89  Shawn Hatt ingh, South Africa’s Role in Nigeria and the Nigerian Elections, International 
Labor Research and Information Group, Cape Town South, 2010, accessed February 25, 
2012, htt p://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2007/hatt ingh260607.html, 5.
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percent of the viewers that watch satellite television in Nigeria.90 Despite all these 
investments by South Africa in Nigeria, the people of Nigeria have not benefi tt ed 
much. This is partly because South African corporations operating in Nigeria are 
allowed to repatriate the profi ts they make out of Nigeria. The majority of South 
African fi rms in Nigeria also source most of the products that they use or sell in 
Nigeria through South Africa and not locally, negating the creation of upstream or 
downstream industries in Nigeria. South African companies operating in Nigeria 
have also created very few jobs. The few they have created have tended to be 
casual. Though not peculiar to South African companies, many Nigerians who 
work in South African owned fi rms have been denied the right to join trade unions. 
For example, MTN has only about 500 permanent jobs.91 Most of its employees are 
casual or temporary workers. 
Conclusion 
Nigeria’s National Development Plans between 1962 and 1980 emphasized the 
central role of the government in economic planning. This ensured progressive 
development and stability of the economy and society. Military intervention 
truncated the entire process as it progressively eclipsed public provision of social 
welfare services, substituted it with ad-hoc welfare structures to legitimize and 
perpetuate successive military rules, sett ing in motion the wholesale marketization 
of social welfare services. The neoliberal orthodoxy was perpetuated paradoxically 
by subsequent democratic regimes without the consent of the citizens. The 
civil regimes privatized the state and substituted public good as private good, 
overlooking the fact that governance is a social contract in which the individual 
abrogates some of his rights to the state and in return enjoys some social benefi ts, 
which fundamentally include protection of life, human dignity, and social welfare. 
The neglect of the welfare of the citizenry has contributed immensely to the crisis 
of development.  More importantly, the proponents of neoliberal policies have 
confessed that they did not consider the  African or Asian economic scenes when 
they propounded their economic manifesto, believing same to be valid for all 
places and at all times. The proponents also admit that liberalization does not 
necessarily imply a swing to market fundamentalism and a minimalist role for 
government.92 For instance, the sponsors of the Brett on Woods institutions ensure 
that neoliberalism coexists with strong protectionism and a desire to heavily 
subsidize some markets in the United States.93 Neoliberalism has promoted 
90  Hatt ingh, “South Africa’s Role in Nigeria and the Nigerian Elections.” 
91  Hatt ingh, “South Africa’s Role in Nigeria and the Nigerian Elections.” See also The Punch 
(Lagos), April 7, 2012.
92  Aluko, “Federal Reform Agenda and the Nigerian Economy.”
93  Harrison, “Economic Faith, Social Project,” 1305.
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various lock-in mechanisms to insulate economic policy from democratic rule 
and popular accountability. This has encouraged capital fl ight, authoritarianism, 
corruption, the mushrooming of the informal sector, coupled with unprecedented 
casualization and precarization of labor. All of these have cumulatively deepened 
poverty and crime in Nigeria, thus undermining the very essence of a democratic 
state which ought to uphold social rights.  
Rather than stick to the principles outlined by the Brett on Woods institutions, 
a new economic policy should be employed that more adequately refl ects the goals 
of development and enhances the chances of local rather than foreign ownership 
of the means of production for more rapid and equitable economic growth. The 
government must practice home-grown development policies that fulfi l the 
developmental aspirations of the masses. Under the reign of neoliberalism in 
Nigeria, capital and wealth have been largely distributed upwards, while civic 
virtues have been undermined by a mindless celebration of the free market as 
the model for organizing all facets of everyday life. Under att ack is the social 
contract with its emphasis on enlarging the public good and expanding social 
provisions such as access to adequate health care, housing, employment, public 
transportation, and education, all of which provided both safety nets and a set of 
conditions upon which democracy could be experienced and critical citizenship 
engaged.94 
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Abstract: The Nigeria-Biafra War att racted enormous international 
att ention not just for the brutal events of the period, but also because of 
how the confl ict was interpreted, especially by foreigners. The ghastly 
images of victims of the war dominated the international media and 
roused the world’s conscience. The confl ict took a toll on human 
lives on both the Igbo and the ethnic minorities in Biafra. While the 
Igbo tragedy was largely perpetrated in Northern Nigeria, that of the 
Biafran minorities – Efi k, Ijaw, Ogoja, Ibibio – occurred mainly in their 
homelands. The gory experiences suff ered by the Biafran minorities 
have largely been neglected in the historiography of the Biafra War. 
This paper examines the experiences of the ethnic minorities in Biafra 
during the war between July 1967 and January 1970. It argues that the 
minorities suff ered a high degree of persecution, molestation, injustice, 
psychological torture and other forms of suff ering which have not been 
fully examined in existing literature. The war subjected them to layers 
of loyalty and disloyalty both to the federal authority and the Biafran 
government. The paper asserts that these minority groups in Biafra 
were as much victims of the war as the Igbo. Hence, they should be 
accorded due recognition in the historiography of victimhood in the 
Nigeria-Biafra War.
Keywords: Biafra; Ethnic; Igbo; Massacre; Minorities; Nigeria; Victims; 
War. 
Introduction
The idea of “minority” is a concept that has posed some defi nitional problems 
among scholars. Owing to the fl uidity of the concept, there has not been any 
internationally accepted defi nition. The earliest att empt to provide a defi nition for 
the term was made in 1977 by Francesco Capotorti, the former Special Rapporteur 
of the United Nations, who defi ned minority as:
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in 
a non-dominant position, whose members – being nationals of the State 
– possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics diff ering from 
those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense 
of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, 
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religion or language.1 
The problem with this defi nition is that it only covers persons belonging to ethnic, 
religious, or linguistic minorities. There is no provision for other minority groups 
in terms of diff erent social categories grounded in sexuality, gender, age, class, 
race, etc.
Article 1 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities adopted in 
1992 recognizes minorities as a group of people with similar national or ethnic, 
cultural, religious, and linguistic identity, and provides that states should protect 
their existence.2 The article makes reference to the same groups already identifi ed 
by Capotorti. But other groups such as sexual minorities, gender minorities, age 
minorities, and other minorities who also need rights, are omitt ed and consequently 
appear voiceless and unprotected. With the rapidity of socio-cultural, political, 
and economic changes taking place all over the world, the concept of minority 
continues to pose more questions than can easily be answered. A more workable 
defi nition of minority should thus be seen in terms of context. Based on this, I 
defi ne minority quite broadly as any group of people that is disadvantaged when 
compared to the rest of the population. The “minoritization” of a group should 
therefore be seen in terms of the situation and not just numerical weakness. For 
instance, a group can be a majority in terms of numerical strength but a minority in 
terms of political representation. In this situation, the group sees itself as a political 
minority and agitates for equality and justice. The minorities referred to in this 
paper are the ethnic minorities in Nigeria, and they are minorities because of both 
their numerical weakness and poor representation in the national politics. 
The Igbo Victims
The Nigeria-Biafra War started on July 6, 1967 and ended on January 15, 1970. 
The former Eastern Region of Nigeria seceded from Nigeria and declared its 
independence on May 30, 1967, following the massacre of the Igbo people who 
were living in the northern parts of Nigeria. The federal government of Nigeria 
responded to the secession with “police action,” that is, a partial military operation 
designed to crush what it perceived as a rebellion. These actions were the beginning 
of a war that lasted about thirty months. But what was originally interpreted as a 
1  Francesco Capotorti quoted in Offi  ce of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR), “Minority Rights: International Standards and Guidance 
for Implementation” HR/PUB/10/3, accessed August 5, 2012, htt p://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Publications/MinorityRights_en.pdf, 2.
2  OHCHR, “Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities Adopted by the General Assembly Resolution 47/135 of December 
18, 1992,” accessed February 28, 2013, htt p://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/
MinorityRights en.pdf. 
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domestic confl ict later took on an international dimension as state and non-state 
actors like Britain, the USSR, France, the Red Cross, and the World Council of 
Churches became involved in the confl ict. The war received one of the highest 
humanitarian interventions in recent history. The massive number of children and 
women facing starvation att racted the att ention of groups like the World Council 
of Churches, the International Committ ee of the Red Cross, Caritas Internationalis, 
Interreligious Aff airs for the American Jewish Committ ee, and UNICEF.3 The 
relief eff ort resulted in unusual Jewish-Christian co-operation.4 Countries like 
the United States, Germany, France, and the Nordic Countries made enormous 
contributions towards the relief eff ort.5 The international media also highlighted 
the humanitarian crisis in the war-torn region and successfully brought this part 
of the world into global focus. The New York Times, The London Times, La Stampa of 
Italy, and Le Monde of France were some of the newspapers that eff ectively covered 
the war.  
The dominant argument in the historiography of the Nigeria-Biafra War, 
both within academia and the popular media, is that the Igbo were targeted 
for extermination by the Muslim north. A year before the war, during the 1966 
massacres of Easterners in Northern Nigeria, the alleged indiscriminate bombing 
of civilian targets and the widespread hunger in secessionist Biafra did a lot to 
rouse the world’s conscience to the humanitarian crisis facing Biafran peoples. 
The international media played a signifi cant role in exposing the humanitarian 
tragedies, especially in the Igbo-speaking parts of Biafra. And many years after the 
war, scholarly accounts of the war, mostly by scholars from the Igbo-speaking parts 
of Baifra, have privileged insights into some of the most hideous acts unleashed 
on Biafrans during the war. Yet, not much has been reported about the atrocities 
perpetrated against the minorities in Biafra, both by the Nigerian military forces 
and the Biafran militias.  This is a gap in Biafra’s history. 
Newsweek, in one of its reports titled “The Resurrection of Biafra,” stated that 
“some of the worst massacres of the war, in fact, occurred when federal troops 
captured minority regions -whereupon the minority tribesmen turned on the Ibos 
in bloody fury.”6 This quote presents the Igbo as the victims in the hands of the 
minority groups, without reference to any experience the minorities might have 
3  National Archives Enugu (NAE) MSP/6 Catholic Relief Services, Special Issue: Nigeria/
Biafra Relief, Summer Edition, 1968.
4  NAE, MSP/6 Catholic Relief Services, Special Issue: Nigeria/Biafra Relief, Summer Edition, 
1968.
5  The Nordic countries comprise of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden and 
their associated territories, the Faroe Islands, Greenland, Svalbard, and Åland Islands.
6  “The Resurrection of Biafra,” Newsweek, March 24, 1969. Ibo refers to the same group as 
Igbo. Ibo was commonly used in colonial writings. 
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had in the Igbo-dominated region before the arrival of the federal troops.  Another 
report claimed that “in some areas outside the East which were temporarily held 
by Biafran forces, as in Benin and the Mid-Western Region, Ibos were killed by 
the local people with at least the acquiescence of the federal force: about 1,000 Ibo 
civilians perished at Benin in this way.”7  Nigerian troops were said to have hunted 
and killed Igbo males above the age of fi ve, leaving the impression that the war was 
waged in a genocidal spirit.8 Colin Legum, a Commonwealth correspondent for 
The Observer, London, also noted that “the worst killing occurring among the Ibos 
has come from the struggle itself that inevitably produced conditions of famine.”9 
Peter Enahoro, who seemed to have sympathised with Biafra wrote: “The Ibos are 
bearing the burden that rightly belongs to all who sought progress for Nigeria.”10 
Gordon Wainman, a volunteer for the Canadian University Service Overseas at 
Kurra Falls in Nigeria, reported the massacre of 30,000 Igbos in Northern Nigeria.11 
Wainman said that many of those who were killed were either buried in mass 
graves or left to rot in the fi elds with a thin layer of dirt thrown over them to 
reduce the stench of the decaying fl esh. 
While not denying the gruesome atrocities committ ed against the Igbo during 
the Biafra War, there is an error in the representation of the victims of the massacres. 
For instance, some of the victims of the 1966 massacre in Northern Nigeria were 
members of minority groups but were generally grouped with Igbos. The report 
of the G. C. M. Onyiuke-led tribunal clearly shows that many people belonging to 
ethnic minority groups in Eastern and Mid-Western Nigeria were victims of the 
May 1966 att ack perpetrated by Northerners.12 Members of the minority groups 
were easily mistaken for Igbos because it was diffi  cult to diff erentiate between the 
two by mere physical appearance. There were no facial marks as could be found 
among the Hausa and the Yoruba, and the patt ern of dressing, mostly western, 
was similar.  N. U. Akpan, Secretary of Government, Republic of Biafra, noted:
The killings in North in 1966, particularly those which occurred from 
7  Conor Cruise O’Brien, “A Condemned People,” The New York Review ix, no. 11, December 
21, 1967.
8  Ibid.  
9  Colin Legum, “Nigeria vs. Biafra: On Taking Sides,” Christianity and Crisis: A Christian 
Journal of Opinion, xxix, no. 9 (March 26, 1969): 151.
10  Peter Enahoro, “A Night of Deep Waters” Nigeria/Biafra, April 1969. Peter Enahoro was 
the brother of late Anthony Enahoro, former Federal Commissioner for Information and 
Labour under General Gowon. Peter’s support or sympathy appears to have been with 
Biafra.
11  Gordon Wainman, “I had a Ringside Seat at a Nigerian Massacre,” Toronto Daily Star, 
December 14, 1968.
12  Report of the Atrocities Tribunal: Appendix B: Eyewitness Accounts of the 1966 Pogrom, 
December 1966.
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the end of September, were indiscriminately directed against people 
from Eastern Nigeria, known in the North by the generic name of 
Yameri...The subsequent att empts in the North to distinguish between 
the Ibos and other peoples of Eastern Nigeria came too late to make 
any impression on the non-Ibo members of Eastern Nigeria, who now 
shared the same fears and dread of the North as the Ibos.13 
The indiscriminate killing of members of Eastern Nigeria accounted for the divided 
loyalty of the minority leaders. While some supported the Biafran secession, others 
felt it was bett er to remain as Nigerians. 
The Politics of Ethnic Minorities in Nigeria
Nigeria, like most African countries, is a multiethnic society with many ethnic 
minorities. The ethnic minority groups in Biafra include, but are not limited to 
Efi k, Ibibio, and Ijaw, and are located along the Eastern border and the oil rich 
southern coast. They are found in the present-day Cross River, Akwa-Ibom, 
Rivers, and Bayelsa States, forming a larger part of the area now known as the 
Niger-Delta region. In 1966, they constituted about 40 percent of the population of 
Biafra, formerly Eastern Nigeria, while the Igbo made up the remaining 60 percent. 
Although these designated minority groups belonged to the Igbo-dominated 
Biafra, they still maintained their distinct ethnic identities throughout the war. All 
the minority ethnic groups had their separate historical origin, distinct language, 
and cultural practices.  
Part of the overarching argument about the war is that it was a war of two 
majority ethnic groups - the Hausa-Fulani and the Igbo.14 This interpretation is 
simplistic and available evidence suggests otherwise. It was rather a war between 
the minorities and the majorities in Nigeria. The fi rst and second military coups 
on January 15 and July 29, 1966 respectively, ushered in a historic moment in the 
history of the minorities in Nigeria. The Richard’s Constitution of 1947 created 
a faulty regional structure that encouraged regionalism in Nigeria’s post-
independence politics. Apart from the fact that one of the regions was large enough 
to dominate the other two regions, the political parties in the federation were 
regionally oriented with politicians like Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo, 
and Ahmadu Bello, depending on ethnic and regional support to achieve national 
power. For instance, the NCNC led by Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo, was seen as 
an Igbo party while the NPC led by Ahmadu Bello, a Hausa, was considered a 
Hausa-Fulani party. The Action Group was called a Yoruba party because its 
leader, Obafemi Awolowo, was Yoruba. Within the existing regional structure, 
13  Ntieyong U. Akpan, The Struggle for Secession, 1866-1970 (London: Frank Cass, 1972), 152. 
14  Conor Cruise O’Brien, “A Condemned People.” 
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minority aspirations were sometimes ignored but could easily be used to promote 
party propaganda.15 Leaders of the minority ethnic groups found themselves in 
a disadvantaged position in the entire federal political equation. It was against 
this background that minority leaders in diff erent regions formed movements 
that started agitating for the creation of more states where their interests could 
be adequately protected. Some of the major movements that were formed before 
independence included the Calabar-Ogoja-River (COR) State Movement in the 
Eastern Region, the Mid-West State Movement in the Western Region, and the 
Middle-Belt State Movement in the Northern Region. These movements were 
neither cultural nor national groups but were “situationally” or circumstantially 
formed to agitate for minority rights in the larger state. Though not homogenous, 
the ethnic minorities were able to form formal structures that represented their 
groups, a development that challenges constructivist arguments that the “lack of 
pure identities means that groups are not homogenous and cannot be represented 
through formal structures.”16 
The leaders of these state creation movements believed that the formation 
of more states would eliminate their fears of domination by the majority ethnic 
groups. This concern led to the sett ing up of the Minorities Commission by the 
colonial authorities in 1957.17  It was evident that state creation would allay the 
fears of the minorities and guarantee more stability in the federation, but the 
Commission pointed out that if new states were created, they would be given 
two years to sett le down before independence could be granted to the country.18 
As events later revealed, the euphoria of gaining the long awaited independence 
blinded the national leaders to other realities. As the domination of the minorities 
continued, riots from minority areas like Tiv lingered. The Tiv under the leadership 
of Joseph Tarka had agitated for the creation of the Middle-Belt State. The Mid-
West minorities in the former Western Region formed their own state as a result 
of the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) and National Council of Nigeria and 
Cameroon (NCNC) plot against the Action Group (AG – a Yoruba-led party). The 
Mid-West creation was a way of weakening the infl uence of the Action Congress 
in the Western Region.
The growing agitations of groups dedicated to improving the fortunes of 
minorities in Nigeria received a remarkable boost by Nigeria’s fi rst and second 
15  NAE (Unclassifi ed document), “Understanding the Nigerian Crisis,” Benin: Department 
of International Aff airs and Information, Benin, 1968, 5.
16  Stephen May et al., Ethnicity, Nationalism and Minority Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 8-9.
17  Michael Crowder, The Story of Nigeria (London: Faber and Faber, 1978), 242.
18  Nigeria Ministry of Information, The Struggle for One Nigeria (Lagos: Ministry of 
Information, 1967), 3.
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coups of the late 1960s. While the fi rst coup dismantled the infl uence of the 
Hausa-Fulani potentates, the second coup dislodged the Igbo from their positions 
of military control. These developments altered the balance of power and ethnic 
minorities in the army and civil service became central players in Nigerian politics. 
General Yakubu Gowon, who is Ngas, a minority ethnic group in the Northern 
Region, had Colonel Akahan, a Tiv, as his Chief of Staff . Some commentators 
interpreted the new leadership structure as the government of Middle-Belt 
minorities that emerged to dominate politics of Northern Nigeria.19 When Lt. 
Colonel Joseph Akahan died in a plane crash, some leaders of the Middle-Belt 
region accused Northern leaders of masterminding his death.20 Although there 
was no evidence linking Akahan’s death to Northern leaders, the ensuing 
controversy led to the withdrawal of Tivs from diff erent parts of the North to 
Tiv land.  At the centre of the civil service were minority group members such as 
Allison Ayida, Philip Asiodu, and A. A. Att a, who were regarded as the “super-
permanent secretaries” because of their infl uence. People also regarded these 
“super-permanent Secretaries” as members of the “Oxford tribe” because they had 
received their degrees from Oxford University.21 Ayida and Asiodu, particularly, 
belonged to Gowon’s three-member kitchen cabinet.22 Edwin Ogbu, who was a 
Permanent Secretary in charge of External Aff airs, was equally a minority from the 
Middle-Belt. Apart from Obafemi Awolowo, a Yoruba, some of the commissioners 
who largely championed the war politics were of minority ethnic origin.  Anthony 
Enahoro, Commissioner, Ministry of Information and Okoi Arikpo Commissioner, 
Ministry of External Aff airs were minority members. There were obviously other 
members of Gowon’s cabinet from the majority ethnic groups but those of the 
minority ethnic groups appeared to have wielded more infl uence. The Nigeria-
Biafra War era was perhaps the fi rst time members of the minority groups could 
occupy many important positions in the military, politics, and civil service. The 
assistance provided to Gowon by the increased number of minorities in the civil 
service and army was critical in the administration’s successful prosecution of the 
Nigerian civil war.  
The minorities’ ascendancy after the July 1966 coup created an opportunity 
for them to address the grievances which they had long expressed through their 
movements. The project of state creation came at a time when the country was in a 
political stalemate. The coups and countercoups, the massacres of Igbos in diff erent 
19  Department of State, Telegram, The Death of Akahan, August 1967.
20  Ibid. 
21  John J. Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1977), 26.
22  Ibid., 150.
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parts of Nigeria, the failure to implement the Aburi Accord by the Nigerian 
government, the declaration of the Republic of Biafra, and the creation of twelve 
states by General Gowon worsened the tension between Nigeria and Biafra.  It was 
a clash of rights, and both General Ojukwu and General Gowon seemed to have 
legitimate claims. Biafrans claimed the right to survival while Nigerians claimed 
the right to the corporate existence of the country. Two new states were carved out 
of the former Eastern Region, leaving it with a total of three states. This seemed to 
be a trump card for the federal government to court the minorities and forestall 
the Eastern secession. That was obviously the immediate objective but the long 
term goal of the minority leaders in state creation was to liberate the minorities 
from majority dominance. While the argument in favour of state creation was 
ostensibly to ensure stability and national unity, it was no less a struggle of the 
minorities against the old dominant majorities in the various regions. Within the 
Hausa-Fulani leadership, state creation was considered a dangerous development, 
but to the new states like Kwara and Benue-Plateau, it was an opportunity to get 
liberated from the Hausa-Fulani hegemony.23 For some of the ethnic minorities in 
the former Eastern Region, state creation meant liberation from the alleged Igbo 
domination. 
Ethnic Minorities as Victims in Biafra
Violent confl icts such as the Nigeria-Biafra War infl ict serious injuries and create 
victims of all kinds. To the outside world, the known victims of the war were the Igbo 
who, apart from being targets of the 1966 massacres, also suff ered indiscriminate 
bombings and monumental starvation that allegedly took about two million lives. 
Within the forty-two years since the war ended, more revelations about the war 
atrocities on the minorities have emerged. Surviving records and oral histories of 
the war suggest that minorities in Biafra became individual and collective victims 
of the war. These accounts also reveal how individuals and groups committ ed 
heinous atrocities under the pretext of either fi ghting a war of survival for Biafra 
or a war of national unity for Nigeria. 
One recurrent question that comes up about the Biafran minorities is: what 
was the att itude of the minorities to the Biafran secession? This cannot be answered 
with certainty. While Biafra claimed that the minorities were wholeheartedly in 
support of the secession, the federal government maintained that the minorities 
had been longing to be liberated.24 Suzanne Cronje, one of the most prolifi c 
journalists on the Biafra war, observed that “the feelings of the minorities were 
23  National Archives United Kingdom (NAUK), FCO 38/222, Political Aff airs, (Internal) 
Demonstration.
24  O’Brien, “A Condemned People.”  
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diffi  cult to defi ne.”25 In the fi rst place, the anti-Igbo uprising which would have 
come from the minorities as people that needed liberation did not emerge, nor 
was there any noticeable form of unrest among the minorities under the Biafran 
administration. Loyalties were, in fact, divided. The supporters of the Biafran 
secession were those who felt that the Easterners as a group had shared the same 
fate as victims of the 1966 massacres and expulsion from the North, while those 
who joined the Nigerian government saw it as an opportunity to have a separate 
state of their own and be free from any domination. Although the ethnic minorities 
had clamoured for a separate state of their own, it was very diffi  cult to determine 
what they actually wanted during the war. A plebiscite could have given them an 
opportunity to express themselves but the proposal was strongly rejected by the 
federal government who felt it would imply a withdrawal of the federal troops to 
the prewar boundaries.26   
To understand the divergent att itudes of the minorities to the Biafran 
secession, an examination of oral histories from people who occupied positions of 
authority during the war as well as from ordinary people is necessary. The Ikun in 
the present day Cross River State presents a good example of the crimes committ ed 
against the minorities. The Ikun clan is in the Biase Local Government Area of 
Cross River State. The people share a common boundary with the Ohafi a, an Igbo 
clan, in the present day Abia State. When the war broke out, Biafra stationed some 
of its troops in the Cross River region, including Ikun. According to a female 
survivor-victim of the Biafran occupation, the Ikun initially supported Biafra and 
had friendly relations with the soldiers, who were also accommodating. As time 
went on, tensions emerged. Some Ikun men were suspected of collaborating with 
Nigerian soldiers. This led to arrests, looting, rapes, and other atrocities in Ikun 
land.27 William Norris of the London Times who visited Biafra, also reported an eye-
witness account in which some men of Ibibio ethnic origin were beaten to death at 
Umuahia on April 2, 1968.28  These Ibibios who included old men and young men 
were apparently suspected of collaborating with advancing Nigerian troops. They 
were reportedly frog-marched across an open space while the local people att acked 
them with sticks and clubs.29 Oral testimony by the survivor-victim corroborates 
25  Suzanne Cronje, “Two Levels of Truth,” Nigeria/Biafra, April 1969. 
26  U.S. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-5, Part 1, Documents on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1969-1972, 
Document 35.
27  Anonymous, Oral Interview by Atu Charles at Amanki Village in Ikun Clan of Biase Local 
Government Area, April 14, 1994. Transcript in my custody. The informant is described as 
victim-survivor because, she lost her four day old baby and grandmother. 
28  Department of State, Telegram, Nigerian Rebel Atrocities, May 1968.
29  Ibid. 
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this account. According to the eyewitness, Biafran soldiers allegedly took Ikun 
men to Ohafi a for a meeting but never brought them back. The informant also 
alleged that the soldiers returned to the community and rounded up some men 
within their reach and shot them. This survivor who lost her four-day old son and 
her grandmother seemed to have suspected foul play from the Ohafi a people who 
share a common boundary with her community.  The victimization continued 
until the Biafran headquarters likely issued an order that people should not be 
killed again.30 By this time, the remaining people had escaped the community, 
leaving behind only the soldiers, the Ohafi a, and some Ikun who were said to be 
of mixed blood - half Ohafi a and half Ikun. These remaining groups, according to 
the survivor-victim shared the fi sh ponds, forests, and farms belonging to Ikun 
people. 31 
In a related account, B. J. Ikpeme, a member of a minority group and retired 
Senior Medical Offi  cer in the then Eastern Region revealed atrocities perpetrated 
by Biafran soldiers against the minorities in some towns in the present-day Cross 
River and Akwa- Ibom States. Ikpeme argued that Ojukwu’s declaration of the 
Republic of Biafra had been issued against the wishes of the majority of the people 
of Calabar, Ogoja, and Rivers Provinces, who for many years had agitated for a 
separate state of their own. According to Ikpeme, the Igbo leadership, who did 
not like the minority agitation, decided either to force the fi ve million non-Igbo 
minorities into the new republic or eliminate them. It was on this basis, claims 
Ikpeme, that Biafran soldiers were quickly sent to the minority areas to “keep down 
the people, detain or even kill all who dared raise a voice in protest against the 
idea of Biafra.”32 It was during this period that the non-Igbos started experiencing 
diff erent forms of inhumane treatment, ranging from torture, detention, to killing. 
Ikpeme himself was detained in what he described as a “concentration camp” and 
was later transferred to a prison cell where he was given urine to drink when he 
demanded water.33 
Ikpeme described instances where the Biafran soldiers allegedly perpetrated 
atrocities against some members of non-Igbo groups. In Asang town in Enyong, 
from where Ikpeme originated, about four hundred people were carried away 
to an unknown destination. Another town called Att an Onoyon in the same 
30  Anonymous, Oral Interview by Atu Charles.
31  Ibid.  
32  Presbyterian Church of Canada Archives (hereafter PCCA), “The Secessionist Regime 
and the Non-Ibo ‘Minorities’ in the East of Nigeria.” This was a text of statements at the 
Peace Talks on the Nigerian Civil War, at Kampala, Uganda. Ikpeme who was a retired 
senior medical offi  cer in the former Eastern Region also served as a member of the Federal 
Government delegation at the Kampala Peace Talks. 
33  Ibid. 
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Enyong was burnt down with many people killed by the Biafran soldiers. In Ikot 
Ekpenyong in the present day Akwa Ibom State, Biafran soldiers were said to 
have shot many villagers. Ikpeme also recounted that similar killings carried out 
by Biafran soldiers took place in places like Ikot Okpot and Idoro. He equally 
alleged that when the Nigerian troops landed in Calabar on October 18, 1967, 
about 169 civilians in detention were lined up and shot by Biafran soldiers. This 
same allegation had also been published in The New York Times as an informational 
advertisement by the Consulate General of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in New 
York.34 These two accounts, given by the survivor-victim of Ikun and Dr. Ikpeme, 
portray similar pictures of gross atrocities but with diff erent underlying objectives. 
Biafra ran a special operations group known as the Biafran Organization 
of Freedom Fighter (BOFF). This was a paramilitary organization set up by the 
civil defence group in Bende.35 This special operations group was instructed to 
suppress the enemy, but they apparently targeted some minorities in Cross River 
and Akwa Ibom States on the account of sabotage against the Biafran government.36 
Philip Effi  ong, who was from one of the ethnic minorities, probably ordered 
the BOFF’s “combing” operations after the death of one Major Achibong. In an 
interview, the informant did not reveal the circumstances surrounding the death 
of Major Achibong who was equally a member of a minority group. He argued 
that if Effi  ong ordered any “combing” operation, it could not have been aimed 
at exterminating members of his ethnic group. What the informant’s testimony 
reveals is that some members of the BOFF who also operated as the Bende Special 
Operations group could have taken advantage of the assignment to accomplish 
selfi sh interests.  For instance, an intriguing revelation about the Bende Special 
Operations group shows that some of its members decapitated their victims for 
ritual purposes.37 Head-hunting in warfare was a cultural practice in some parts 
of Biafra known as Old Bende. This tradition survived up to the beginning of the 
twentieth century. In the pre-colonial era, it was culturally acceptable for members 
of a certain age-grade to go to war and come back with human heads as trophies. 
Successful warriors who brought back trophies were highly honoured among 
members of their age-grades and in the whole community. The war situation 
might have created an opportunity for the warrior group to reactivate a tradition 
that had faded out as a result of Western infl uence. 
Although all the minority groups suff ered diff erent forms atrocity, the 
34  “The Nigerian Civil War: the Way Out,” The New York Times, July 8, 1968.
35  Bende area covers some local governments in the present-day Abia State.
36  S. B. A. Atuloma, Oral Interview by Sydney Emezue at Umuahia, September 18, 1990. 
Transcript in my custody.
37  Ibid.
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minorities in the Rivers area seemed to be worse off . Apart from torture and other 
forms of human rights abuse, they were also evicted from their homes. For instance, 
when two strategic villages on the New Calabar and Sombriero Rivers fell to the 
federal troops in February 1968, the news that followed was that the majority 
of the soldiers that led the operation were Rivers young men, predominantly 
Kalabari.  As a consequence, many people from Bakana, one of the major Kalabari 
towns, were removed and sent to Igbo towns like Umuahia, Owerri, Abiriba, and 
Ozuitem, most likely to avoid further infi ltration of the enemies.38 Chief Samuel 
Mbakwe, who served as Biafran Provincial Administrator for Okigwe Province, 
noted the infl ux of refugees from Port Harcourt but did not explain whether or 
not they were forcibly removed by the Biafran forces.39 We do know that Biafrans 
tended to regard anyone who stayed at his post and was overrun by the federal 
advance as a collaborator. An Irish priest who served in Rivers State reported 
that the Igbo soldiers were suspicious of some Rivers people who sometimes led 
federal troops through their lines along hidden creeks.40 This att itude, according 
to the priest, created a mixture of panic, fear, and hatred among the Biafran troops 
towards some indigenous people of Rivers State. People who were maltreated 
were said to have been involved in this act of “sabotage” against Biafra. 
At Bolo and Ogu in Okirika, and Onne in Eleme, the villagers suff ered the 
same fate. After the batt le at Onne, Biafran troops removed the town inhabitants 
suspected to have collaborated with federal troops and sent them to the Rainbow 
Town headquarters of the Biafran 52 Brigade in Port Harcourt. Graham-Douglas, 
who was also thrown into detention, claimed to have seen about three hundred 
men detained in the Rainbow Town. He asserted that no fewer than six thousand 
Rivers people were sent to diff erent refugee camps in Igboland.41 
It is important to point out that propaganda played a prominent role in the 
Nigeria-Biafra war. Some of the pamphlets published by Nigeria and Biafra or their 
agents were loaded with misinformation. Commenting on a section of Graham-
Douglas’ pamphlet titled, Ojukwu’s Rebellion and World Opinion, John Tilney of 
Liverpool observed, “That may be propaganda. What Graham-Douglas says may 
not be wholly true. But we are all plagued by propaganda by both sides.” 42 Both 
Biafra and Nigeria professionally engaged propaganda as a potent tool in the war. 
While Biafra hired Markpress, Nigeria engaged the services of Galatz ine Chant 
38  Nabo B. Graham-Douglas, Ojukwu’s Rebellion and World Opinion (Lagos: Nigerian National 
Press, 1968). 
39  Samuel Onunaka Mbakwe, Oral Interview by Sydney Emezue at Avutu/Etiti, September 
18, 1990. Transcript in my custody.
40  Donald Musgrave, “Priest Tells of War Atrocities,” The Irish Times, May 23, 1968.
41  Graham-Douglas, Ojukwu’s Rebellion, 17.
42  House of Commons Report on the Nigerian Situation, London, August 27, 1968.
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Russell and Partners for the public relations job.43  Graham-Douglas’ story that the 
minorities in Biafra had suff ered more hardships and molestations than the Igbo 
could claim to have suff ered at the hands of Northern Nigerians was apparently 
part of Nigeria’s propaganda which he also presented in London in August 1968.44 
Graham-Douglas’ comments about Biafra had been criticised by an offi  cial of the 
British High Commission for lack of inside information about Biafra.45 He was 
equally described as talking “out of the back of his head” because of unverifi able 
comments he made about the Catholic Church.46   
J. O. J. Okezie observed that Graham-Douglas’ switch to the Nigerian side 
might have led to the Igbo att itude of distrust towards the minorities. He pointed 
out however, that the sabotage accusation was not limited to the non-Igbo. The 
Onitsha people who were indisputably Igbo also suff ered the same intimidation 
and humiliation. Many of their prominent leaders were said to have been detained 
by the Ojukwu-led government for allegedly contributing to the fall of Onitsha 
and Enugu.47 A brigadier in the Biafran Army narrated his personal experience in 
the sabotage accusation. The offi  cer stated that two members of a local militia had 
writt en an anonymous petition against him. When the writers were discovered, 
they confessed that they had undertaken to cut down his popularity. The two 
offi  cers were brought before Ojukwu by Major General Effi  ong who ordered their 
execution. The offi  cer in his magnanimity refused to execute the petition writers.48 
This illustrates how the sabotage syndrome assumed a life of its own and became 
an instrument of victimization against innocent persons. There is no doubt that 
many people lost their lives without substantial evidence, as is common during 
times of war whether in Africa or elsewhere.  
Violence towards the minorities was not perpetrated only by the Biafran 
troops. The federal troops were equally culpable of this crime. In Andoni area of 
Rivers for example, an appeal was sent to the Biafran Head of State narrating how 
the villages were att acked on Sunday, March 31, 1968 as a result of their loyalty to 
Biafra. The report alleged that the att ack was led by fi ve collaborators who were 
likely members of the minority group. One of the victims of the att ack was said 
to be an undergraduate student of the University of Ibadan who was a member 
of the Biafran Provincial Enlightenment Committ ee. Apart from burning down 
43  NAUK, FCO 65/ 445/1, Nigeria Press: Biafran Propaganda.
44  “Graham –Douglas Speaks,” West Africa, August 17, 1968.
45  NAUK FCO 23/182, Nigeria and Biafra, 1968.
46  Ibid. 
47  J. O. J. Okezie, Oral Interview by Sydney Emezue at Umuahia, September 17, 1990. 
Transcript in my custody.He was a medical doctor and fi rst republic politician. 
48  P. C. Amadi, Oral Interview by Sydney Emezue at Owerri, September 19, 1990. Transcript 
in my custody. Amadi was a brigadier in the Biafran Army. 
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houses and property, the petitioners also alleged that over 500 persons including 
children were killed. 49 Similarly, approximately 2,000 Efi ks were reportedly killed 
in Calabar by the federal troops.  The victims were said to be returnees who 
revolted against the federal occupation. The killing was reported to Gowon who 
subsequently appointed Dr. J. B. Ikpeme as Chief Justice when the killing had 
nearly been completed.50  
The Nigerian Air Force left their own mark in the minorities’ areas. They were 
accused of indiscriminate bombing of civilian occupied areas. William Norris of 
the London Sunday Times in an article titled, “Nightmare in Biafra,” reported how 
the high-fl ying Russian Ilyushin jets dropped bombs in civilian centres in Biafra. 
He stated that, 
Slowly, but eff ectively, a reign of terror has been created. The ruins of 
Mary Slessor Memorial Hospital at Itu, of the hospital of Itigidi, and of 
the Cheshire Home at Port Harcourt, stand as a kind of grisly memorial 
to something that must be if words are to retain any meaning. It is 
certainly not war.51 
These targets were all in the minority areas. Cronje similarly reported that the 
Nigerian Air Force had bombed the minorities as much, if not more than the 
Igbos.52
The plight of the minorities had been so alarming that several Nigerian 
students of Rivers State origin in London staged a peaceful protest against the 
killing and displacement of their people. In addition to a peaceful march from 
Trafalgar Square to the House of Commons in London, they also sent out petitions 
to the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), His Holiness 
Pope Paul VI, Emperor Haile Selaisie, the British Prime Minister and other relevant 
groups, asking them to bring pressure on the warring parties to stop the senseless 
killing of innocent and defenceless people of Rivers State.53 The petition may not 
have produced any direct result but must have contributed to the pressure on the 
warring parties to negotiate for peace. 
The war had been fought not just for political reasons but also for economic 
motives with oil resources in mind.  And for a national economy that had begun 
to depend on oil, control of the oil-bearing region that was inhabited by the ethnic 
minorities became crucial to winning the war. Recent discoveries by the Ministry 
49  Eastern Nigeria, Ministry of Information, The Case for Biafra, fi rst independence anniversary 
edition (Enugu: Ministry of Information, Republic of Biafra, June 12, 1968), 28-29.
50  Ibid., 27-28.
51  Quoted in Eastern Nigeria, Ministry of Information, 23.
52  Suzanne Cronje, “Two Levels of Truth” Nigeria/Biafra, April 1969.
53  NAUK, FCO 38/222, Demonstration. 
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of Defence-sponsored humanitarian demining project butt ress the claim that the 
oil rich minority areas were hotly contested in the war. Although the war had 
ended, people in diff erent parts of the then Biafra continued to die from accidental 
explosion of unexploded mines. According to Emeka Uhuegbu, the fi eld 
administrator of the United Nations mandated demining project, the minority 
areas of Rivers State had the highest number of landmine victims. Akwa Ibom and 
Imo States follow on the list.54  The demining team discovered 400 unexploded 
bombs in a forest in Rivers State. These bombs and landmines had killed several 
unsuspecting villagers who went to farm, resulting in the nickname, “evil forest.”55 
Conclusion
Brutal confl icts such as the Nigeria-Biafra War infl ict painful injuries on all people. 
The few cases examined in this article show that the ethnic minorities were also 
individually and collectively victimized. Gowon’s creation of new states and 
Ojukwu’s declaration of the Republic of Biafra created a sharp division among 
ethnic minorities. This meant loyalties and disloyalties to the two warring parties. 
Upholding Nigeria’s principle of twelve-state structure meant sabotage to Biafra, 
while supporting Biafra’s secession implied rebellion to the Nigerian government. 
The minorities in the oil-rich region seemed to have been worse off  in the war. The 
warring parties wanted to control the region and its oil resource. It was largely for 
this reason that the region assumed strategic importance and became a theatre of 
war.  
General Gowon’s declaration of “No Victor, No Vanquished” after Biafra’s 
capitulation was a good social therapy that helped calm the war tensions among 
the groups that were involved in the confl ict. Nevertheless, the vestiges of the 
war are still present in the minority areas. The unexploded bombs in these highly 
contested areas still pose a huge threat.  People continue to lose their legs and lives 
following accidental explosions. The victims of these accidental explosions are yet 
to be given adequate rehabilitation.56 
Despite the suff erings of the ethnic minorities during and in the aftermath of 
the war, their perspective in the civil war discourses remains almost forgott en. Their 
victimhood, like that of the Igbo, should be accorded a place in the historiography 
of the Nigeria-Biafra War. The struggle for Nigeria’s unity wouldn’t have been 
possible without the minorities. The struggle over control of the oil-rich region 
placed them in a disadvantaged position by exposing them to more dangers and 
54  Emeka Uhegbu, interview by author, July 14, 2011. Field Administrator, Ministry of 
Defence-sponsored Humanitarian Demining Project. The project was mandated by the 
United Nations Organization under the Ott awa Convention of 2001. 
55  Uhegbu, interview by author. 
56  Ibid. 
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destruction. Recognizing the ethnic minorities as victims would place them in 
their rightful position in the nation’s history.   
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BOOK REVIEWS
Dávila, Jerry. Hotel Trópico: Brazil and the Challenge of 
African Decolonization, 1950–1980. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2010, ix + 312 pp.
Jerry Dávila’s Hotel Trópico is a masterful study of international relations through 
the lens of intercultural relations and is perhaps the most persuasive scholarship to 
demonstrate concretely the ways in which cultural factors can impact the direction 
of a nation-state’s foreign policy. Two of the key themes that underpin Dávila’s work 
are the ideas of “lusotropicalism” and “racial democracy.” Lusotropicalism was a 
term coined by Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre to describe the supposedly 
distinctive Portuguese mindset which made Portugal a bett er colonizer than 
other Europeans. According to Freyre, because of Portugal’s warmer climate and 
closer proximity to the equator, the Portuguese were more adaptable to tropical 
climates, more open to the mixing of races, and thus had a more humane type of 
colonialism. For Freyre, and many others, Brazil stood as a shining example of the 
benevolence of Portuguese colonialism, particularly through its racial democracy, 
under which Brazilians purportedly lived in complete racial harmony in a society 
without racial discrimination. According to Dávila, “this set of beliefs was so 
powerful that it formed the conceptual framework not only of those Brazilians 
who supported Portuguese colonialism but even of those who shunned Portugal, 
favored decolonization, and sought ties with independent African nations” (21).
Dávila shows how at various times throughout the Cold War, most notably 
in 1961 as part of President Janio Qaudros’s “Independent Foreign Policy” and 
in 1975 in its involvement in the Angolan civil war, the Brazilian government 
tried to use its historical ties to Africa in tandem with the ideas of lusotropicalism 
and racial democracy to help Brazil form relations with African states. According 
to Dávila, Brazil thought that “Africa was its natural sphere of infl uence, and 
racial democracy was its calling card. In turn, Africa would help propel Brazil 
industrially and bring autonomy from the cold war powers” (51). But this eff ort 
was complicated by the fact that the country was run by a conservative military 
dictatorship from 1964 to 1985, it largely supported Portuguese colonialism when 
nearly every other country in the developing world, especially in Africa, opposed 
it, and it eschewed neutrality to remain tied to the Western camp in the Cold War. 
These factors combined to make Brazil’s outreach to Africa a limited success at 
best.
Despite obstacles along the way, Dávila argues that “the connections 
between Brazil and Africa endured” due to the fact that “Africa remained an 
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abstraction in Brazil, a canvas on which Brazilian national aspirations and racial 
values were rendered. This canvas is signifi cant because of the perception that 
all Brazilians share an African heritage” (255). While Brazil and The Challenge 
of African Decolonization is a worthwhile read for Africanists and diplomatic 
historians as an intriguing study of Brazil’s bilateral relations with sub-Saharan 
Africa during the middle of the Cold War, the book is more than that. It is also 
an impressive blend of the study of race and culture to examine how Brazilian 
foreign policy became conditioned by how white Brazilian elites perceived their 
place in the world. By projecting their constructed mythical image of a racially 
harmonious and discrimination-free Brazil onto Africa, Brazilian diplomats hoped 
that Afro-Brazilians would accept their government’s portrait of national identity 
and domestic race relations. In reality, the opposite proved true. The few Afro-
Brazilians who visited Africa learned of the fallacy of Brazilian racial democracy, 
and, at the same time, discovered that they were much more “Brazilian” than they 
were “African.”
One interesting historiographical debate which emerges from the pages 
of Hotel Trópico is about the primary reason that Brazil decided to recognize 
the MPLA government in Angola in 1975 and the main protagonist of that 
decision. James Hershberg, whose work was not cited by Dávila, writing from 
an American perspective and as a diplomatic historian using both U.S. and 
Brazilian government documents, argues that Brasilia’s decision for recognition 
of the MPLA stemmed from the declining Cold War consensus in Latin America 
and Brazil’s cultural affi  nity for Angola. In short, the Brazilian leadership felt a 
Lusophonic kinship for Angola and by the mid-1970s no longer felt the need to 
keep in lock step with Washington’s wishes.1 Dávila, on the other hand, writing 
from a Brazilian perspective and as an expert of that country’s racial and social 
history, emphasizes Brasilia’s economic incentives for recognizing the MPLA 
government as a way to sustain Brazil’s “economic miracle” of the 1970s. These 
interpretations do not necessarily contradict, but rather complement each other, 
providing greater nuance to our understanding of Brazilian decision-making. The 
two historians also seemingly disagree over who was the central force behind this 
policy, with Dávila focusing on Foreign Minister Antonio Azeredo da Silveira and 
Hershberg Italo Zappa, the head of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry’s Africa and 
Asia Department, and each author barely mentioning the other in their accounts.
1  See James G. Hershberg, “’High-spirited Confusion’: Brazil, the 1961 Belgrade Non-
Aligned Conference, and the Limits of an ‘Independent Foreign Policy during the High 
Cold War” Cold War History, 7, no. 3 (August 2007): 373-388 and especially Hershberg, 
“‘No Longer Anyone’s Sacristan’: New Evidence on Brazil’s Surprise Recognition of the 
MPLA Government in Angola” (paper presented at the Southern Africa in the Cold War Era 
Conference in Lisbon, Portugal, May 2009).
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The book’s strengths are numerous. Deeply researched, Dávila utilizes a vast 
array of sources including memoirs, oral histories, and interviews of diplomats 
involved in Brazilian relations with Africa; newspapers from three continents; 
and primary source research in more than fi fteen diff erent archives in Brazil and 
Portugal. The book is also well writt en and free of unnecessary academic jargon, 
making it an easy read for undergraduate students (indeed, I intend to assign it 
for use in future classes).
Unsurprisingly the book is heavily slanted towards the Brazilian viewpoint. 
While this is to be expected, the scholarship would have been stronger had Dávila 
made greater use of sources from the United States and especially from Africa. 
Without this perspective the reader is left wondering how the United States 
viewed Brasilia’s att empt to break out from its shadow to pursue an independent 
foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa and what, if anything, Washington did to 
try to prevent this. More importantly, I would have liked to have known more 
about how Africans perceived Brazilian att empts to re-orient their foreign policy 
towards their continent. It would have been particularly illuminating to know 
how eff ective Africans felt white Brazilian diplomats were in trying to self-identify 
themselves as culturally “African.”  These minor critiques aside, Dávila should be 
applauded for this scholarly achievement.
Dr. Phil E. Muehlenbeck
Visiting & Part-Time Faculty
George Washington University
Washington, D.C.
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Anyanwu, Ogechi E. The Politics of Access: University 
Education and Nation-Building in Nigeria, 1948-1960. 
Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2011, xvi + 298 pp.
Education is central to nation-building in Africa. The huge investment in mass 
education from the era of decolonization by African leaders and policy makers 
found expression in the pivotal role it is capable of playing in the development 
of the human and material capital of the continent. However, access to mass 
education did not take place overnight. Indeed, until the demise of colonial 
rule, higher education was only available to very few and remained largely 
an elitist project. In The Politics of Access, Ogechi Anyanwu, tackles for the fi rst 
time, the history of the transition of higher education from an elitist project to a 
populist one. According to Anyanwu, the push for mass university education, i.e. 
massifi cation, “is central to understanding Nigeria’s postcolonial socio-economic 
and political history” (1). Anyanwu argues that the “the premise of building a 
modern Nigerian nation underscored the pursuit of mass university education 
policies by Nigeria’s successive postcolonial governments” (1). Although a lot of 
books have been writt en on Nigeria’s education history covering the colonial and 
postcolonial periods, none has tackled the change and continuity in the politics of 
access to higher education.
This brilliantly writt en seven-chapter book is organized chronologically to 
demonstrate how political and economic transformation since the period of colonial 
rule has infl uenced the politics of access to higher education and the character of 
each regime and individuals involved. Chapter one engages some familiar history 
of the introduction of Western education, and the nexus between colonialism 
and education policy, to contextualize the chapters that follow. Anyanwu gives a 
penetrating analysis of the role missionaries played in the introduction of education 
from the 1840s when mission schools were fi rst introduced to southern Nigeria 
and the disposition of the colonial government to it. Although Western education 
helped the missionaries and the British colonial government to produce clerks and 
clergies for their religious and administrative work, the British government did 
not want it to be accessible to everyone. This double standard refl ected the British 
conviction that the training of highly educated colonial subjects was detrimental 
to colonial hegemony. According to Anyanwu the education provided by the 
missionaries was “not relevant to the immediate needs of the people.” But this 
prejudice towards education was not left unchallenged from the second half of the 
nineteenth century as leading African nationalists began to criticize the British for 
not doing enough to fulfi l its mission to “civilize” Nigeria through Western-styled 
education.
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 In response to this criticism, the British, as Anynawu points out, established 
Yaba Higher College in 1934 to give Nigerians clerical and vocational training 
to meet the lower cadre of offi  cials for the colonial service. But the nationalists 
would soon criticize Yaba because its graduates were rated as inferior to their 
counterparts trained outside the country. Moreover, access to the college was 
very restricted to very few “qualifi ed” candidates. Fifteen years after Yaba was 
establish, the University College of Ibadan (UCI, later University of Ibadan) came 
into existence though local and international pressure on the government which 
continued to pay a lip service to higher education for Nigerians. But like the Yaba, 
the UCI, as Anyanwu demonstrates was an elitist project which instead of helping 
to address the long-standing problems of higher education and access, added new 
crises to the ethnic confl agration in the country. 
After presenting the much-required information about higher education, its 
restrictiveness and as a tool of imperialism, and the early move by Nigerians to 
force the British to revise its curriculum to serve the needs of Nigerians, Anyanwu 
then begins to carefully plough through the postcolonial phase of the politics of 
access to university training. Chapters two and three focus on the nexus between 
decolonization and the critical role that education was capable of playing in 
nation building. According to Anyanwu, the constitutional arrangement in 1954 
that gave birth to regionalization played a signifi cant role in creating a new era of 
massifi cation of education as the governments of each of the regions, following the 
recommendation of Ashby Commission set up in 1959 to “help chart the course 
for the country’s educational expansion,” began to make the provision of higher 
education as a signifi cant element towards the drive for regional development. 
In these two chapters, Anyanwu devotes quality space and deep analyses to the 
numerous sentiments expressed by Nigerian nationalists and political leaders 
at federal and states levels about the need to use education to transform their 
polities. By 1962, Anyanwu notes that four new universities founded by regional 
governments of eastern, western, and northern Nigeria had been established to 
address education imbalances and the limited access that the UCI off ered.
The end of the Civil War in the 1970s coincided with the unprecedented 
increase in Nigerian foreign exchange earnings through crude oil, as Anyanwu 
shows in chapter 4. The massive investment in university education during the 
1970s found expression in the Gowon’s drive to heal the wounds of hostility 
through increase in education opportunities needed to close the gap of educational 
achievement between the north and the south. Unlike in the 1960s when university 
education was deeply regionalized, the centralization of university education in 
the 1970s was a strategic tool to accelerate and forge greater national integration 
in an extremely polarized society. Anyanwu clearly pontifi cates that the new 
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universities of the 1970s and the old regional ones were expected to give new 
meanings to Nigeria’s unity, while also helping to address the age-long problems 
of limited opportunity to higher education. Although this expansion fulfi lled 
some of the core agenda of the three military administrations in the 1970s, access 
to university education remained elusive in a country of over 68 million people in 
1968. 
Anyanwu dedicates two chapters to the exploration of changes and 
continuity in the politics of education in the 1980s. New developments such as 
the provision of free education, the involvement of state governments in higher 
education, introduction of a quota system, and the transformation of university 
curricula to emphasize the governments’ quest to industrialize the country through 
science, were among the numerous steps taken to increase Nigerians’ access to 
higher education while att empting to balance long standing problems of ethnic 
division that characterizes the Nigerian states. But as Anyanwu demonstrates, the 
economic crises in the 1980s compelled the government to suspend the expansion 
of university education as it struggled to maintain the existing ones. The fi nal 
chapter of this book tackles the developments in the 1990s, characterized by the 
resumption of an expansion of university education though the establishment of 
specialized universities of science and agriculture. The 1990s also witnessed the 
emergence of private universities that most people believed would reduce pressure 
on government universities and help increase Nigerians’ access to quality higher 
education.
In all, Anyanwu has done a great service to Africanist studies with this book. 
He has given us a book that connects education to broader challenges of nation-
building and the endless quest to balance the numerous primordial interests in the 
country. By connecting the history of access to education with broader challenges 
of nation-building, Anyanwu has helped validate the popular rhetoric that 
education is a signifi cant factor in Africa’s drive towards sustainable development. 
His sources, which include reports by local and international policy organization, 
leading educationists, military and civilians leaders, among other classes of highly 
infl uential people, are qualitatively and quantitatively adequate for a work of this 
scope—even though the gap is the author’s inability to integrate more voices of 
“ordinary” Nigerians on access to university education.
Dr. Saheed Aderinto
Assistant Professor of History
Western Carolina University, Cullowhee NC.
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Arnfred, Signe. Sexuality and Gender Politics in 
Mozambique: Rethinking Gender in Africa. Suff olk, 
United Kingdom: James Currey, 2011, ix + 310 pp.
Are women oppressed in the same way around the world? Are feminists correct 
to assume that men universally discriminate against women? Sexuality and Gender 
Politics in Mozambique is an opportunity to re-conceptualize Western feminist 
analysis and theory. The author explains that during the Second Wave of feminism 
in the 1970s, Western feminists did not think “that gender relations might be 
diff erent elsewhere in the world, and that we could possibly learn about diff erent, 
more balanced gender relations, by studying other cultures” (10). After reading 
the criticisms of Western feminism by African gender studies scholars, Arnfred 
concludes that Western scholarship partriarchalized African cultures. The book 
is her eff ort to provide a new way of examining and understanding gender and 
sexuality, using the Mozambiquan context as an example. 
The book began more than 30 years ago after Arnfred heard the fi rst president 
of Mozambique, Samora Machel, speak on the necessity of women’s liberation in 
1975.  She worked and lived in Mozambique in the 1980s. She returned in the 1990s 
and 2000s to collect data and participate in several academic, professional, and social 
events in the country. This book is presented in three parts, with an introduction 
and epilogue. Using observations and interviews, the author discusses gender and 
sexuality in Mozambique from the perspective and experiences of people in the 
rural areas. She also describes and refl ects on her mental journey regarding gender 
and sexuality. 
The fi rst part of the book has fi ve chapters and explores the policies, 
assumptions, and interpretations that guided gender politics in Mozambique since 
the colonial period. In chapter one, Arnfred tells the story of Mozambican women’s 
participation in the struggle for independence. The women’s accounts here add a 
fascinating, and sometimes comical, dimension to the book. The events and issues 
that defi ned and redefi ned gender and sexuality in Mozambique underscores the 
importance of considering historical, social, and economic contexts in examining 
and understanding diff erent societies. It is a true strength to hear these women tell 
their stories in their own words as few African studies have “her-stories.” 
In part two, which also has fi ve chapters, Arnfred explores a subject that 
fascinated her during her time in Mozambique – women’s initiation rituals. She 
states that the sojourn enabled her to fi nd meanings and interpretations for these 
rituals to understand the women and herself. Initially, she had interpreted the 
ritual as humiliating and oppressive. However, when she conceptualized it this 
way for the women, it meant something else to them. For the women, the initiation 
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ceremony was “about the creation of women” (145). In Mozambique, under the 
light of the moon, girls become women, not through physical and biological 
changes, but through “tests, trials, dances, performances and passing-on of secret 
knowledge” (145). Focusing on this lesser known and probably misunderstood 
custom in this way allowed the author to re-conceptualize/interpret the initiation 
ritual as an empowering tradition. Chapter 10 is a really helpful tool here. In it, 
the author discusses gender from the perspectives of Nigerian gender scholars 
like Oyèrónké Oyewùmí, Ifi  Amadiume, and Nkiru Nzegwu. She applies their 
arguments to the discussion to facilitate or aid one’s re-conceptualizations of gender 
and sexuality. For instance, the section titled “situational gender,” emphasizes 
gender as a fl uid concept. The term “woman” is presented as being overloaded 
“with implications and associations which are irrelevant and disturbing in African 
contexts” (205). This chapter has information to reframe the issue of womanhood 
in feminist scholarship. 
Part three of the book has four chapters and here, Arnfred examines other 
issues. In chapter 11, one reads of male mythologies, chapter 12 of gendered 
power and land ownership, and chapter 13 of sex, food, and female power. This 
part could be described as the “fun” part of the book as one learns more about 
Mozambique’s cultures and traditions. Some of the topics are also regionally 
or ethnically contextualized. For instance, while northern Mozambique is 
matrilineal, southern Mozambique is patrilineal. Since litt le research exists on 
matrilineal societies in Africa, this part is a refreshing addition to the book. More 
importantly, it documents this issue from a political, economic, historical, and 
spiritual perspective. This part will defi nitely add to the discourse on issues like 
empowerment and development projects as it requires one to recognize the place 
and role of men and women. 
Overall, Sexuality and Gender Politics in Mozambique does a wonderful job of 
providing an opportunity to see the subject matt er from another standpoint. The 
author succeeds in her goal of challenging the reader to see gender and sexuality 
in a new way. However, the author sometimes generalizes her arguments and 
fi ndings about Mozambique to Africa as a whole. When one wants others to 
contextualize gender and sexuality, why still believe that what pertains to 
Mozambique pertains to the entire continent? This ties in with the use of the term 
empirical to describe the data. Empirical suggests that the information observed or 
found is true. However, like all things human, empirical data is also infl uenced by 
previous beliefs. While one must applaud her eff orts to be objective in her analysis 
of certain issues, there were times when criticism was called for.
Dr. Aje-Ori Agbese
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Vansina, Jan.  Being Colonized: The Kuba Experience in 
Rural Congo, 1880-1960. Wisconsin: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2010, v + 342 pp.
Scholars are increasingly paying att ention to the complex, diverse, and shared 
colonial experiences of various African peoples and societies. In Being Colonized, 
Jan Vansina retraces the colonial life of the Kuba people and argues that a focus 
on the people’s “shared experiences bring[s] us closer than any other approach 
to a concrete understanding of what life was actually like in that colonial period” 
(328). As he shows in the book, the process by which the Congo became a 
Belgium colony was long; it followed decades of exploring Africa which saw King 
Leopold creating an international African association and sponsoring numerous 
expeditions to the central African region. The Congo was colonized shortly after 
the conclusion of the Berlin Conference on February 23, 1885. Governed initially 
by Belgium’s absolute ruler, King Leopold II, and later taken over by the Belgian 
government following a media campaign against Leopold’s atrocities that E.D. 
Morel championed, Congo grew “eighty times larger than its metropolis” (18). 
According to the author, this feat was achieved because Belgium “was the second 
biggest industrial power in Europe, a power equal to that of the United States” (18-
19). Being Colonized is a comprehensive account of the people’s engagement with 
the complex and dynamic colonial structures, exploring the mostly destructive 
social, political, and economic transformation resulting from Belgian colonial rule. 
As the author reveals in the book, the relationship between European 
administrators, missionaries, traders, explorers, and the Kuba throughout the 
colonial period was unequal. It was a relationship that was “backed by force, but 
ultimately did not rest on force” (4). The author analyzes the social and economic 
devastation that followed the conquest of the kingdom by the Compagnie du 
Kasai, a concession company of the Congo Free State, the wealth and suff ering that 
rubber brought to Belgian and Kuba respectively, the exploitative administrative 
tactics employed to exploit the people — driven, of course, by the mindless pursuit 
of profi t and revenue by colonial offi  cials. According to the author, “it was not 
the trading of rubber by itself that somehow brought destruction with it, but the 
combination of a commercial monopoly allied to a complete abdication of any 
oversight by the state” (85).
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Vansina reveals in the book that both the 1910 decree on the indirect rule system 
of governance and the 1917 decree on compulsory labor considerably reshaped the 
history of colonial Kuba. Aided eff ectively by the Kuba, Belgian colonial offi  cials 
“decided what kinds of crops over what acreage each adult male villager was 
compelled to grow,” and, worst still was that the dehumanization, high deaths 
rates, and punishments following non-compliance was such that “by the 1950s 
about one of every ten men spent time in jail each year and that most men had 
done so at one time or another” (215). Although the colonial authorities believed 
that the economic pressure visited upon the Kuba would result in “development,” 
the author preferred to use the word “exploitation” to characterize the reality of 
the Kuba colonial experience. “By the end of colonial rule practically,” the author 
insists, “no Kuba village was bett er off  than when the era began. . . . Surely, had 
they known the word, the villagers would not have called this development but 
rather the contrary: underdevelopment” (243). 
The uniqueness of this book derives from the author’s ability to weave 
interviews of elders, local news, gossip, and dreams in reconstructing the 
colonial experiences of the people. This bott om-up approach is largely missing 
in Eurocentric writings about African history. The author’s anticipated hopes for 
this book is well placed. According to him, if the book “manages to capture the 
imagination and the interests of most if its readers, and thereby raises greater 
understanding, awareness, and perhaps sympathy for the lives of Congolese 
then and now, it will not have been writt en nor read in vain” (331). Anyone who 
thoughtfully reads this book will agree that the author realized his hope. 
No historical account will adequately put into words the brutalities with 
which European colonists treated Africans during the colonial rule. Congo’s 
mistreatment, both in the hands of the notorious King Leopold II and the Belgium 
government arguably raised European barbarism against innocent Africans to a 
frightening level. That the European colonial powers have not fully acknowledged 
or compensated for the crimes they committ ed against colonial subjects is 
inconceivable. Movements to seek redress for colonial injustices have continued, 
however. For instance, after many years of legal wrangling, the ruling of the 
United Kingdom’s High Court in 2012 permitt ed Kenyans to seek legal redress 
for colonial-era abuses. Britain opted to sett le out of court in 2013, providing $30.5 
million in compensation to 5,200 victims. The British Foreign Secretary, William 
Hague, expressed regret over what he described as “abhorrent violations of human 
dignity” committ ed more than fi fty years ago by his country.1 This landmark case, 
1  James Reinl, “Kenyans Celebrate Mau Mau Compensation Win,”Aljazeera, 
June 7, 2013, accessed August 30, 2013, htt p://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/
features/2013/06/201366133052307633.html.
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I hope, will not only open a doorway to similar claims by millions of Africans who 
suff ered unimaginable crimes in the hands of colonial offi  cials but also open the 
minds of former colonial governments of the inevitability of acknowledging their 
past wrongs in the interest of justice which they so often promote. This is critical 
for, according to Paul Muite, a lawyer for the Mau Mau veterans, “If we are going 
to end impunity around the globe, each nation, each person, must acknowledge 
their wrongdoing.”2
The author’s neglect to cite most of the primary sources he used in the book is 
not an ideal example of how historians should write. Further, although the author 
argues that the atrocities committ ed against the Kuba “are far from the whole 
story of colonial Congo” (58), his book clearly demonstrates that those atrocious 
crimes unquestionably remain at the core of any meaningful understanding of 
the country’s colonial and post-colonial economic, political, and social tragedies. 
That notwithstanding, this book serves as a reminder that colonial abuses, far from 
being exhausted, continue to be explored in diff erent ways by historians. Suited for 
scholars, graduate students, and general readers eager to understand the enduring 
impact of colonial exploitative policies and practices on African societies, this book 
is highly sophisticated and intellectually stimulating; it is sure to make a great 
impression in the fi eld of history and international relations. 
Dr. Ogechi E. Anyanwu 
Associate Professor of History 
Eastern Kentucky University 
Richmond, KY.
2  Ibid. 
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Bruder, Edith, ed. The Black Jews of Africa: History, 
Religion, Identity. Oxford: University Press, 2011, xii + 
283 pp.
The past couple of decades have seen a rising interest in scholarly discourses 
on Jewish Diasporas although the wider global trend is yet to be adequately 
covered in mainstream African studies and African Diaspora studies. Much of 
this lacuna may be att ributed to the eminent Nigerian historian, Adiele E. Afi gbo, 
who on the strength of his works on the Igbo, authoritatively branded related 
studies connecting Igbo origins to Jewish descent as a desperate search for “noble 
ancestry.”3 Thus, in spite of Afi gbo, Edith Bruder’s The Black Jews of Africa is a 
courageous adventure in migration history, cultural crossbreeding, and identity 
formation. Africans have come upon Jewish tradition and legends in diverse 
circumstances and contexts. Gradually, some African groups have used these to 
articulate a new Jewish identity joined with that of the Diaspora. Bruder’s book 
is therefore a timely rebirth of this fi eld of scholarship; it presents readers with a 
solid narrative situated in a transnational context. The author perceptively refl ects 
on the complex strands of evidence tending to connect both the sub-Saharan 
“African Jews” and their “cousins” in China, India, Middle East, Europe, and 
North America with their supposed motherland in Palestine. 
Being one of the very few recent studies to track the dispersion of Jews 
continent-wide, the vast scope of coverage and methodological approach is one 
of the distinguishing markers of Bruder’s work. The ten chapters of the book 
are chronologically and thematically organized in three parts with an absorbing 
“Epilogue.” I consider Part One (Chapters 1-4), which explores the prehistory of 
the Jewish sett lements on the continent, an outstanding coverage of migration, 
ethnicity, and political identity formation. Evidently, Bruder struggled to winnow 
through Biblical prophesies, hearsays, myths, and legends that have followed 
the trail of the globetrott ing Jews across diverse times and geographical spaces. 
Among the most popular myths linked with the so-called “Lost Tribe of Israel” are 
the Solomon and Queen of Sheba love fest, the Biblical children of Kush, and the 
Western-fabled depiction of Ethiopia and Africa as the homeland of a ghostly noble 
man identifi ed by fi fteenth century Portuguese fortune hunters as Prester John. 
As the author points out, “Biblical narratives and prophesies that mentioned the 
putative existence of Jews in the land of Kush (i.e. Africa) provided the scriptural 
foundations for subsequent complex connections between Jews and Africa” (17).
Part two (chapters 5-7) details the variety of connections between Judaism 
3  See Adiele E. Afi gbo, Igbo History and Society: The Essays of Adiele Afi gbo, ed. Toyin Falola 
(Trenton, NJ: African World Press, 2005), 8-9.
Book Reviews | 53
Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 1, Issue 1, Spring 2014
htt p://encompass.eku.edu/jora/
and blackness. The foci of discussion in chapters 5 and 6 is the development, in 
Western accounts, of Jews and blacks as the archetypal “Other” whose “discovery 
and invention reinforced and perhaps established the notion of Europe by focusing 
on it and surrounding it with a strange periphery” (37). This construction of 
otherness gained popular acclaim in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
as Europeans in Africa tried to force their thoughts and ways of life into the heads 
and minds of Africans. Bruder methodically runs a reality check on the role 
played by the early European missionaries, soldiers, and scholars—particularly 
the anthropologists such as M. D. Jeff reys, and Thomas Basden and others—who 
in the idiom of now discredited Hamitic hypothesis, saw the vision of outside 
infl uences, particularly Jewish ones, in every signifi cant cultural element existing 
in Africa. Bruder provides the reader with a very rare insight into the motives 
behind such colonial inventions and how these ideological interjections interacted 
with their local African sub-strata to create new projections that were appropriated 
and popularized by black thinkers like Edward W. Blyden, James Africanus 
Horton, W. E. B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, to mention but four, whose writings and 
speeches were primarily aimed to dismiss the European-held notion that people of 
African descent were inferior (39-77). 
Part three (chapters 8-10) articulates a historical account of Jewish 
infl uences in sub-Saharan Africa. As Bruder stated in chapter 8, the penchant for 
“genealogical dreams” have seen several African societies “stage their arrival in 
Africa through elements of an original “otherness” (97). Chapters 9 and 10 detail 
a number of African groups that have self-identifi ed as Jews. These communities 
range from the widely known Ethiopians and Igbos, to the lesser known Zakhor 
of Mali, Balula Jews of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Lembe found 
in South Africa and Zimbabwe, the Jews of Rusape found in Zambia, the Tutsi 
of Rwanda and Burundi, the Kasuku of Kenya, and the Abayudaya of Uganda. 
Of particular interest are the motivations that led these ethnic groups in western, 
eastern, central, and southern regions of the continent to assert Jewish genealogy. 
Among other things, these groups wanted to connect kinships with the Patriarch 
Abraham, identifi ed in the Holy Bible as the chosen friend of God Almighty (161-
185).
The epilogue “Ancient Myths and Modern Phenomenon” is a summary of 
the various catalysts broadly explaining the political, economic, and sociocultural 
magnets that prompted the rise of these mythical-genealogical connects and their 
interjections with the Judo-Christian ideology. The pertinent question remains: 
why is it that this particular period of African history should witness a rebirth 
of Judaizing movements and which factors should be taken into consideration to 
understand their dynamics? In answer, the author concludes that critical “social 
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and technological developments” have given the various groups self-identifying 
as “African Jews” new opportunities and encouragement in forms of websites and 
access to rare books and periodicals now helping researchers to chase further this 
rather romantic idea of godly ancestry (188). 
Overall, Bruder’s new book has reopened an interesting topic that both 
students of transnational studies and ethnic politics will want to explore further. 
Although it did not break the bank in answering most of the lingering questions 
on the authenticity of Afro-Jewish kinship, I strongly urge those interested in 
Diaspora studies in general and African and Jewish studies in particularly to read 
The Black Jews of Africa.
Dr. Raphael Chijioke Njoku 
Associate Professor of History
Idaho State University
Pocatello, ID.
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Allina, Eric. Slavery by Any Other Name: African 
Life under Company Rule in Colonial Mozambique. 
Charlott esville: University of Virginia Press, 2012, xiii 
+ 255 pp.
In Slavery by Any Other Name, Eric Allina gives an impressive account of life in 
Mozambique during the time of its colonization by Portugal. Mozambique is 
historically signifi cant largely because it had the most extensive as well as the 
longest Portuguese colonial presence in Africa. Allina’s argument that the 
Mozambican colonial experience was not fundamentally diff erent from that which 
had prevailed elsewhere in colonial Africa pales in the face of the magnitude, 
length, and dominance of the conscripted or forced labor system adopted by the 
Portuguese administration, especially in the Manica and Sofala territories. Allina 
uses offi  cial documents and records from the long-lost and unexplored colonial 
archive as well as interviews from more than one hundred surviving Mozambicans 
to gain an understanding of both the process and consequences of colonization 
and forced labor for Mozambique. These documents reveal the depth of colonial 
brutality, the ideologies that informed the Portuguese colonial att itude towards 
Africans, the complex and calculated process through which company offi  cials 
and colonial administrators negotiated and sustained colonial policies, the impact 
of forced labor on African lives and the various strategies Africans used to subvert 
colonial policies.
The book is divided into eight chapters, with substantial introductory and 
concluding chapters. The chapters off er progressive accounts of the substance 
and length of the colonial servitude imposed upon the Mozambicans, which 
Allina unequivocally defi nes as enslavement for the benefi t of the white sett ler 
populations who required both local knowledge of agriculture and labor to farm 
and sustain the cultivation of maize and, then cott on, and also hut taxes from 
the inhabitants of the region to fund the colonial administration.  Allina argues 
that while slave masters in South Carolina’s rice plantations or Jamaica’s sugar 
plantations were unpretentious about their slave dealing enterprise, colonial 
offi  cials in Mozambique “camoufl aged their coercion of Africans behind the legal 
fi ction of ‘contracts’…The Portuguese administrators who oversaw subcontracted 
slave labor claimed that compelling Africans to work [for the benefi t of empire], 
‘by force if necessary,’ would improve their moral and material well-being” (6).
Chapter one traces the history of Portugal’s sett lement in southeast Africa, 
heralded by the arrival of Vasco da Gama and his crew on the east coast of Africa 
in 1498, on their way to India. By the end of the sixteenth century, Portugal had 
shifted its att ention to the interiors of south-central Africa, famed for its abundance 
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of gold. Although met with malaria and fi erce resistance by the locals, by mid-
nineteenth century, Portugal would succeed in establishing its colonial stronghold 
in Mozambique, clothed in its two-pronged rhetoric of “suppressing slavery” in 
the African hinterlands and “civilizing the blacks.”  For Portugal, this process of 
“civilizing Africans” was conducted through forced or conscripted labor.  As the 
author notes, “Africans in Mozambique—and, indeed, all ‘natives’ throughout 
the Portuguese empire—were required to work for a period of time required by 
local authorities” (33). “Work” for the African was defi ned as forced labor in vast 
estates owned by white farmers for litt le or no pay for a period of six out of twelve 
months, with inadequate shelter, insuffi  cient food, and litt le or no medical care.
Chapter two documents the vastness and brutality of the forced labor 
practices in Mozambique during the colonial period.  According to Allina, “the 
territory’s enormous demand for African labor, employers’ unwillingness to pay 
wages suffi  cient to draw voluntary workers, the company’s political and fi nancial 
investment in the concession-holder’s success, and the near-total autonomy of 
local administrators all meant that there was litt le to stand in the way of pervasive 
enslavement of the African population” (47).  And, contrary to the colonial rhetoric 
of forced work as needed to improve and advance Africans, many reports point to 
the opposite eff ect. The inhumane treatment of the Mozambicans led to the death 
of many, as well as the impoverishment of African communities deprived of much 
needed labor since their most abled and skilled men were conscripted to work for 
the colonial government and Portuguese owned farms, even during the planting 
seasons.
In Chapter three, Allina documents the failure of the League of Nations to 
eff ectively address the question of contract or forced labor (slavery) when the 
issue was brought before it during the early part of the twentieth century. Neither 
the 1924 nor the 1930 Convention of Slavery succeeded in curtailing forced or slave 
labor, primarily because those charged with evaluating the question and drafting 
the resolutions consisted of colonial agents who themselves were well aware of 
European reliance on forced labor in colonial Africa and, hence, were unwilling 
to oppose it.  Chapters four and fi ve deftly tackle the challenges of forced labor 
and the various tactics employed by locals to subvert and circumvent colonial 
policies of enslaving Africans in their own homelands. Tactics included “melting” 
or disappearing into the hills, fl ights and border crossings.  Since these strategies 
resulted in the loss of labor and tax revenues for the colonial government, the 
Portuguese countered by instituting laws and practices to limit freedom of 
movement and other forms of resistance. Off enders received punishment that 
ranged from brutal fl ogging to unpaid forced correctional labor for up to forty 
years. Rebellions were squelched decisively and with terrorizing force. Services 
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of chiefs in recruiting and maintaining conscripted labor were obtained either 
through force, intimidation, or voluntary compliance due to fear of reprisal.
In chapters six, seven, and eight, Allina traces the political and social 
impact of forced servitude on African lives in the Mozambique. Forced labor did 
not only relegate Africans to the positions of slaves in their own country, but it 
also eff ectively thwarted the precolonial political relations that had existed in 
the communities. The heavy reliance on able men for conscription undermined 
traditional respect for elders who were now deemed “weak” and “useless” in their 
customary role as protectors of the youth and the community. The tendency of 
older men to off er up their young in order to avoid slavery severely damaged the 
communal system of support by which elders nurtured and groomed the youth, 
and the youth respected the elders in return. If the elders lacked integrity to protect 
the youth, the youth felt they could no longer rely on the elders to protect them.
The narrative Allina provides in Slavery by Any Other Name is a bit redundant, 
and the focus of the book is rather narrow. Exploring primarily how offi  cial 
documents illuminate the complex ideologies and infl uences that initiated and 
helped sustain Portugal’s extensive forced labor systems in Africa, the book 
neglects to examine the roles Africans played in helping to extricate themselves 
from the clutches of colonial slavery and exploitation. Allina does suggest that an 
essential aspect of the narrative is its inclusion of African voices and refl ections on 
their experiences. But, those perspectives focus largely on general disgust for forced 
labor, complaints, and strategies used to withstand oppression.  The narrative fails 
to address the nature, extent and roles played by the nationalistic movements that 
eventually won independence for Mozambique in 1975, and, hence, eff ectively 
ended Portuguese direct rule and the forced labor system. Additionally, the book’s 
concluding chapter raises more questions than it addresses.  The chapter off ers 
cursory mention of the role of the Christian missionaries in colonial Mozambique 
as well as the negative impact of colonial legacies on post-independence 
Mozambique’s economic and political policies and practices. Mentioning these 
pivotal topics in the conclusion, without adequate examination, is problematic. 
For instance, it is never clear if the missionaries had been there all along during the 
colonial regime, serving as both agents and critiques of empire, or if they became 
a later introduction as Portuguese colonial rule began to wane in the 1960s and 
1970s.
Nonetheless, despite its weaknesses, Slavery by Any Other Name is useful 
in placing the story of Mozambique within the larger framework of African 
colonial history.  In spite of the substantial existing scholarship on the European 
colonization of the African continent, the depth and extent of the phenomenon and 
its impact on the African experience are yet to be fully explored or understood. This 
58 | Book Reviews
Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 1, Issue 1, Spring 2014
htt p://encompass.eku.edu/jora/
book draws att ention to that fact. The recovery of the Mozambique’s Company’s 
colonial archives might also prove useful, as Allina suggests, in assisting scholars 
to uncover the relatively still unknown biographies of the men who helped 
perpetrate such atrocities on Africa and its peoples, and their larger role in Africa’s 
colonial history.
Dr. Salome C. Nnoromele
Professor of English
Director of African & African American Studies 
Eastern Kentucky University
Richmond, KY.
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Honwana, Alcinda. The Time of Youth: Work, Social 
Change, and Politics in Africa. Sterling, VA: Kumarian 
Press, 2012, xiv + 222 pp.
In The Time of Youth, anthropologist Alcinda Honwana focuses on youth 
experiences of what she terms waithood, that is that prolonged stage between 
childhood and adulthood, a phenomenon resulting from failed neoliberal and 
global socioeconomic and political crises. Organized around eight chapters, this 
book tells a very coherent story of how youth that are undergoing the prevailing 
challenges of globalization are seeking “creative” ways of managing their lives. 
In articulating this story, Honwana focuses on the phenomenon of waithood and 
argues that it encompasses the lives of the majority of young Africans regardless of 
where they live. It shows that the class dimension provides an important window 
through which to understand the experiences of youth in the global south. But she 
also notes that despite the constraints youth face, waithood is both creative and 
transformative. Using data collected from Mozambique, South Africa, Senegal, 
and Tunisia, Honwana does a good job of providing useful historical contexts of 
these countries that allow readers to understand her arguments without losing the 
ethnographic narrative.
In chapter one, Honwana frames her book within existing studies of youth, 
and defi nes youth and waitood before providing historical contexts of the four 
African countries on which she focuses and the interconnectedness of the stories of 
their youth. In the second chapter, she expands on her use of the phenomenon of 
waithhood as it aff ects not only youth in Africa but also in developed countries. In 
chapters three and four, we respectively get an analysis of the specifi c aspirations 
youth have as they face the challenges of waithood and the coping mechanisms 
they apply. Chapter fi ve focuses on sexuality and intimacy as new ways of coping 
with waithood. Honwana then provides an analysis of how youth reject old-
fashioned party politics (chapter 6) through social movements that bring about 
social change in Tunisia (chapter 7) and the ways that waithood is assuming a 
global phenomenon that aff ects youth in Madrid, London, New York, and Dakar, 
among other global locations (chapter 8).
Honwana writes well and is able to balance theory with ethnographic data 
that she gathered in the fi eld while acknowledging and engaging with vast strands 
of literature on the topic. Her analysis of waithood is centered on experiences of 
African youth but she is also able to show both its particularities and similarities 
with other continents and varied ways youth respond to it. Some of the common 
strategies for coping with waithood include: “border crossing,” exemplifi ed by the 
physical crossing of national borders for immigrants from Guinea trying to eke a 
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living on the streets of Dakar, Senegal; young women traders bringing goods into 
Mozambique from South Africa and trying to pay as litt le tax as possible or none 
at all; and Senegalese youth crossing through the Mediterranean Sea to Europe 
in search of greener pastures. There are youth also who are living in waithood 
despite being in formal work, as is the case of young Tunisian young females 
Honwana interviewed who were working in European telemarketing call centers 
located in Tunisia that hire university graduates to meet customer relations needs 
for the European market. Outside of these coping strategies employed by youth 
in both informal and formal sectors, Honwana devotes a chapter on intimacy, a 
phenomenon that entails the reconfi guration of masculine and feminine identities. 
Men who traditionally have had power over women because of their ability to 
provide materially now cannot project such masculine identities because their 
economic instability does not allow them to be “real men.” As a result, Honwana 
argues that because unemployed young men in waithood lack the economic 
advantage that employed men have over women, sexual power becomes the 
only tool left to them (102). On the other hand, young women through intimate 
relations with multiple men strategically engineer sexual relationships to achieve 
their goals and maximize their gains (93). Further, by ensuring that the material 
benefi ts of sexual engagements do not come from a single man who could exercise 
control over them, these women try to guarantee their relative independence.
There are two other discussions that Honwana makes that are very important 
in understanding youth in Africa today—citizenship and social change. Regarding 
citizenship, Honwana shows that youth have rejected formal party politics 
but have rallied behind movements that seek to right the social ills caused by 
corruption, bad governance, failed political promises, and other administrative 
challenges. Here Honwana provides examples of youth engagement in hip-
hop music that challenge the status quo and of social movements that change 
political arrangements as happened in Senegal and Tunisia. In this way, Honwana 
confronts traditional theories of citizenship that tended to understand it as the 
gradual (and passive) acquisition of civil, political, and social rights. The stories 
that she provides of youth across Africa show that rights are not a given but rather 
something that youth have to fi ght for, which leads to an approach to rights that 
encompasses both rights and participation.
Finally, Honwana shows that youth do not just participate in social 
movements but also bring about much needed social change. By providing a 
detailed account of the processes that led to Tunisia’s political change, including the 
careful coalition that youth were able to form with workers, politicians, and other 
social groups, Honwana shows what it takes for youth social movements to bring 
about change. When Tunisian youth’s desire for social change became relevant to 
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the broader spectrum of Tunisia’s population, Tunisian youth were able to bring 
about the fall of Ben Ali’s regime. Although this book is engaging, repeating some 
information in diff erent chapters is unhelpful. Nonetheless, anyone working on 
issues of youth in both in Africa in particular and other continents in general will 
fi nd this book useful. 
Dr. Mwenda Ntarangwi
Associate Professor of Anthropology 
Calvin College, Grand Rapids, MI.
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Yewah, Emmanuel and Dimeji Togunde, eds. Across 
the Atlantic: African Immigrants in the United States 
Diaspora. Illinois: Common Ground, 2010, vii + 174 pp. 
Although the total number of African immigrants in the United States is not as 
large as other immigrant groups, they have increased substantially over the years. 
According to the U.S. Census, of the 37,961,000 foreign-born population in the 
U.S. in 2008, 20,150,000 were from Latin America; 10,356,000 from Asia; 4,969,000 
from Europe; and 1,436,000 from Africa. In 1960, there were only 35,000 African 
immigrants in the United States. Across the Atlantic: African Immigrants in the 
United States Diaspora edited by Emmanuel Yewah and Dimeji Togunde, has made 
an important contribution to the understanding of the new African Diaspora in 
the United States. According Yewah and Togunde, “pre-migration characteristics 
such as media and literary representation of the United States, socialization 
experiences including exposure to oral traditions, religious identity and pluralism 
which become important tools for immigrants to cope and to navigate through 
the complexities of their new society have received litt le or no att ention in the 
literature”(3).
Before reading this book, I expected to fi nd answers to the following seven 
questions: (1) How many African immigrants have emigrated to the U.S. in the 
post-World War II era and what countries are they from?; (2) What are the factors 
that caused them to emigrate to the U.S.?; (3) What are the educational, social 
and economic characteristics of these new African immigrants in the U.S.?; (4) 
Are there negative implications to Africa for losing this highly selected group of 
emigrants?; (5) Are there benefi ts to Africa due to this “brain drain,” or do they 
maintain connections with their homelands?; (6) How do they adapt and cope 
in their new communities in the U.S.? Or do they maintain their ethnic/racial, 
religious/spiritual, and class identities?; What are their sett lement patt erns?; and 
(7) What is their impact on the host society?
The nine chapters of this book did an excellent scholarly job answering all 
of the above questions. For example, chapters one, two, three and fi ve answered 
questions one and two; chapters four, fi ve, six, and eight answered questions three 
and six; and chapters seven and nine answered questions four and fi ve. 
While answering all of these important questions, many interesting 
interrelated sub-themes emerged out of the book under the central theme of culture: 
culture as ethnicity or language; culture as religion; culture as food; culture as 
home community development (remitt ances for school fees, food, house building, 
etc.); culture as internet use; culture as political participation in homeland aff airs; 
or culture as media (newspapers, television, movies) and literature (books and 
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public intellectual publications). 
Pertaining to culture as ethnicity or language, Anthony A. Olorunnisola 
presents useful information in chapter six on how ethnic/linguistic characteristics 
tend to remain permanent. He shows that just as ethnicity plays a central role in 
relations in Africa, it also plays a central role in the lives of African immigrants in 
their assimilation and pluralism experiences in the U.S.: “we argue that African 
émigrés enter the United States more specifi cally as Ogonis or Hausas (of Nigeria); 
as Hutus or Tutsis (of Rwanda); as Afrikaners or Zulus (of South Africa)” (105). 
Connecting this to religion, Emmanuel K. Twesigye also notes in chapter 8 how 
Christian or Muslim African immigrants in the U.S. would establish their own 
Churches or Mosques, and that “some Africans wanted to establish their own 
churches and mosques in order to serve as the leaders and determine their liturgy, 
language and preaching style as well as the topics and cultural or moral content of 
the sermons” (139-140). 
In chapter seven, Ayokunle Olumuyiwa Omobowale, Mofeyisara Oluwatoyin 
Omobowale and Olawale Olufolahan Ajani present useful information about the 
rapid increase in the amount of remitt ances to Africa, which are now more than 
foreign aid from the West, and they reveal the various economic, educational, and 
social benefi ts to family members and communities in African nations. However, 
in chapter nine Okechukwu Iheduru explains the diffi  culty that Africans in the 
Diaspora are experiencing from political leaders in their home countries in att aining 
dual citizenship and voting rights at home. As a result, African immigrants 
fi nd themselves not att aining U.S. citizenship because it could cost them their 
citizenship at home, but they also tend not to run for political offi  ce in the U.S. due 
to the same lack of citizenship. On January 16, 2011, Jeremy Hay wrote an article 
in the Press Democrat about a rare development whereby a Nigerian immigrant 
banker, Amy Ahanotu, in California won a seat on the Rohnert Park City Council.1
One visible limitation of the book is the lack of information on non-black 
African immigrants in the U.S. and how they relate to their black counterparts. 
Bridget Teboh notes in chapter fi ve that 23 percent of the 881,300 African 
immigrants in the U.S. in 2000 were categorized as white and that “the end of 
apartheid in South Africa and Zimbabwe appears to count for the presence of 
white Africans” (80-81). Another group of Africans also categorized as white in 
the U.S. is Arabs with hair texture and skin color such as those of the prominent 
Lebanese American, Ralph Nader. But as Amadu Kaba points out, the late black 
president of Egypt, Anwar Sadat, is categorized as black in the U.S., just as the 
1  Jeremy Hay, “Rohnert Park Councilman’s Journey from Civil War to Civic Role,” The Press 
Democrat, January 16, 2011, accessed February 19, 2011,
htt p://www.pressdemocrat.com/article/20110116/ARTICLES/110119598.
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leader of Egypt and Commander in Chief of the Egyptian military from February 
2011 to June 2012, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, is considered a black 
man in the U.S., but his immediate predecessor, Hosni Mubarak, is seen as a white 
man.2  Two of the three leaders of Egypt since the 1970s are considered both black 
men and Arabs, Arab being their culture. Anthony A. Olorunnisola discusses this 
racial categorization belief system of white Americans in chapter six (108-109). 
Across the Atlantic: African Immigrants in the United States Diaspora has made 
a useful contribution to the body of knowledge on the African Diaspora in the 
New World, especially the United States. It presents an overview of the numbers 
and characteristics of African immigrants in the United States. The book illustrates 
the infl uence of culture on African immigrants in the United States. The author 
conceptualizes and utilizes culture to explain how ethnicity, language, food, 
family, remitt ances, and politics impact the day-to-day lives of African immigrants 
in the United States and their home countries in Africa.
Dr. Amadu Jacky Kaba
Associate Professor of Sociology
Seton Hall University
South Orange, N.J.
2  Amadu Jacky Kaba, “Explaining President Barack Obama’s First Visit to Africa (Egypt): 
Three Phenomena of Africa and Africans as the Core of U.S.-Arab/Muslim Relations,” 
African Renaissance 6, no. 2 (2009): 103-106.
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Barz, Gregory and Cohen, Judah M., eds. The Culture of 
AIDS in Africa: Hope and Healing through Music and the 
Arts. New York: Oxford, 2011, xvii + 538 pp.
There is a sizeable literature that exists on HIV/AIDS in Africa. The majority 
of these works focus on the impact of the disease in Africa and the eff orts of 
Western organizations and scholars to fi ght the pandemic. Very few discuss the 
intervention eff orts and programs Africans themselves have made regarding 
this disease. The Culture of AIDS in Africa addresses this dearth by exposing the 
approaches Africans and non-Africans have used in the fi ght against HIV/AIDS. 
Specifi cally, according to Barz and Cohen, the thirty two chapters show the “many 
pathways by which music and other expressive forms gained prominence in Africa 
as agents for addressing HIV and AIDS, helping individuals and communities 
address the local and international conversations coursing through their lives in 
the process” (5). More importantly, one learns the African meaning of HIV/AIDS 
and understands the disease and its impact from an African context. The book 
uses examples, descriptions, and analyses of projects conducted mostly in eastern 
and southern Africa.
The book is divided into an introduction, six sections, and a conclusion. 
Each section is separated from the other by an interlude, which is a short personal 
essay or song. The chapters discuss the use of various media such as newspaper 
cartoons, drama, puppet shows, and photography in health-intervention and 
education programs. Most of the chapters focus on the use of music. 
The fi rst section consists of four essays that discuss music’s eff ective role in 
describing the devastation the disease has wrought and the hope that remains. 
These chapters off er not just discussions and descriptions, but actual lyrics, 
personal experiences, and scripts as well. For instance, Born in Africa, one of the 
fi rst documentaries on the epidemic in Africa, is transcribed in chapter three. 
The second section has three chapters. Here, one learns from authors who have 
developed and carried out arts-based health intervention programs from music 
to youth forums. These touching and interesting accounts give powerful and 
useful insights from the perspectives of people who worked in Africa. One learns 
that fi ghting the disease in the continent requires understanding the individual, 
communal, and political perceptions that exist.  
The fi ve essays in the third section discuss the use of edutainment media in 
several countries, including South Africa, Cote d’Ivoire, Togo, and Botswana. For 
people interested in developing campaigns on the disease, these essays provide 
great insight into multimedia approaches. In chapter 12, Eckhard Breitinger 
suggests that campaigns could succeed if governments are positively involved. 
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Specifi cally, the chapter discusses Malawi’s use of posters to fi ght the epidemic. 
The chapter also includes photographs that show the importance of considering a 
country’s unique cultural characteristics and values in creating messages. As the 
author puts it, “displaying moral, ethical, and aesthetic values that are current” in 
countries “off er one strategy for government intervention in a multi-front batt le 
against a devastating and vexing pandemic” (143). The fourth section has fi ve 
essays that examine the contributions of individual artistes/creators like Ugandan 
singer Vilimina Nakiranda, South African photojournalist Gideon Mendel, 
Zimbabwean singer Oliver Mtukudzi, and singers and playwrights from Kenya 
and Tanzania. The essays demonstrate how these performers have used culturally 
unique symbols and language to reach their audiences and contribute to the 
discourse. 
Part fi ve of the book examines HIV/AIDs responses from a group perspective. 
Here, one learns of the contributions of performance groups, such as choirs, drama 
groups, and circuses in four chapters. Leah Niederstadt’s essay, “’I’m a Rich 
Man, How Can I Die?’ Circus Performance as a Means of HIV/AIDS Education 
in Ethiopia,” gives a fascinating account of the activist and entertainment roles 
of circuses. Though faced with a number of challenges, circuses are an important 
part of Ethiopian culture. Authentically Ethiopian circuses use culturally specifi c 
folktales, clothes, songs, and dance to highlight ethnic identity. Niederstadt 
explains that Ethiopian circus performance is similar to theatrical performance. 
Economic and social issues like HIV/AIDS in the 1990s made the circus a “theatre 
of necessity” (325). Using a combination of skits, acrobatics, juggling, and 
more, circus members perform with edutainment goals. The Circus in Ethiopia 
organization also publishes a magazine that spreads information on HIV/AIDS. 
The fi nal section of the book has four essays, which are case studies using various 
research approaches. Here, the authors explore diff erent art forms or artistes, such 
as South Africa’s kwaito music and female hip-hop artistes in Uganda, and their 
contributions to the fi ght.
Overall, this collection of essays makes an important contribution, not only to 
health-intervention or cultural studies, but also to various areas in the humanities, 
social sciences, and more. Readers will learn of campaigns and strategies that have 
worked. For the most part, however, the authors do not take a critical view of their 
work. There is litt le or no discussion of what was done wrong, what could have 
been done bett er. Such information would be helpful in knowing what to avoid. 
The collection also lacks a contribution on the infl uence or use of social media 
and the internet, which have gained ground in diff erent parts of Africa and have 
been benefi cial to the fi ght against the pandemic. Nevertheless, the collection has 
fascinating and useful information that shed light on what Africans are doing for 
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Africans through the arts in the case of HIV/AIDS. 
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